Getbig Bodybuilding, Figure and Fitness Forums
July 30, 2014, 12:59:26 PM *
Welcome, Guest. Please login or register.

Login with username, password and session length
  Home Help Calendar Login Register  
  Show Posts
Pages: [1] 2 3 ... 28
1  Getbig Main Boards / Politics and Political Issues Board / Re: 10 reasons Im no longer a leftist. Good article on: July 29, 2014, 12:40:12 AM
Haha standard lib respose....attack the poster personally and completely ignore the actual subject matter of the post.

You're a turd, Son. 

Flush yourself down the toilet.
2  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: An unexpected symptom of generation nothingness on: July 24, 2014, 01:55:55 AM

My mind is now grounded in reality.  I have a Coppertop battery. 
3  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Electricity is measured by the force it has on matter in volt meter, therfore.. on: July 19, 2014, 11:18:16 PM
that is how the device works thus the amount of force you use to lift matter is measurable not only in pounds

Kinda marginal thinking there, heme iron crusader.  Maybe wear a respirator to protect against those solvent fumes.  Bad news for brain health.
4  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Please join me in congratulating Roger Bacon for his Blue Stars! on: July 17, 2014, 11:03:19 PM
Excellent, Roger.  You do generally hit the nail on the head.  Congratulations.
5  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: i have gained insight into human experience... on: July 17, 2014, 03:16:42 AM
Just half an hour ago, I was binging on several containers of my roommates [1] ben & jerry's.  After dropping two containers in the trash, I was suddenly overtaken by a profound sense of self-loathing and guilt, I decided to make a quick stop to the local QFC to buy him some replacements.

Before I begin, I admit, I was dressed quite faggishly: european shirt with capped sleeves to show off the superior delt tie-in and veiny-as-a-cock 15-inch upper arms, and fairly short athletic shorts rolled up at the waistband (promptly rolled down after pulling up to the parking lot, whereupon my to-be-questioned masculinity was further dwindled by the presence of several wise-cracking 'brews) [2].  I snagged the creamy tribute [3] and decided to head to the Italian section in order to pick up some preservative free boxed tomatoes [4], whereupon I make eye contact with an slightly older fellow dressed none-too-dissimilarly.

Now, I casually mention having "picked up" the boxed tomatoes, but in reality I probably spent about 15 minutes looking for these delicacies (before finally finding them in the stores SECOND entire row dedicated to canned tomatoes, WTF).  All the while, this rather nervous-looking man pretended to be intently focused on one of the fifteen varieties of spaghetti before him.  At one point, it became clear we were going to pass each other; he apologizes profusely and excuses himself rapidly no less than five times, his face rapidly transforming through a series of stupid grins and sheepish smiles, even though I'm a good fifteen feet away from him yet!.

"FFS what a meltdown!" I think to myself as a sense of dread slowly starts to build in my gut.  For the next ten minutes or so, I travel from aisle to aisle, and my skittish admirer is never far behind.  As I stand with my face practically jammed into the spice rack (zero possibility of noticing anything around me) he eventually passes by, again loudly issuing apology in breathless tones, giving another nervous smile.  I then notice he has nothing in his basket -- somehow I'm not surprised.

I'm practically running as I make my way to the self-checkout stand, and what do you know, he conveniently pops up two kiosks down, as if on cue.  Making my purchase in record time, I double back through the store, ducking through one of the vacant, standard check-outs and out the main entrance.  Luckily, I parked about twenty feet away, and I'm able to breathe a sigh of relief as I speed away from the store half a minute later.

I reflect on the truly incredible sense of disgust that filled me as I felt this homo's eyes perpetually glancing over, just waiting for me to look up, practically bursting with all manner of schmoey thoughts, hopes, and deulsions.  Then, a horrible question dawned:

Is this how women feel, all the time? [5]

[1][2][3][4][5] no homo

If the shoe pinches your foot, cut it off
6  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: You were once the youngest person in the world at one point on: July 16, 2014, 09:51:01 PM
today is the first day for the rest of your life.

Well, that's true of every day but one the day you die.

No, it's true of that day, too.
7  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: You were once the youngest person in the world at one point on: July 16, 2014, 09:49:50 PM
At some point you'll be the last person to fart once, and the first person to lie twice.
8  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Curt James-the most retarded Palumbo ass licker EVER on: July 09, 2014, 10:56:06 PM
dayum what a effin ridiculous guy hahaha cant believe it...I asked what model of bike Lumbo Scumlumbo bought and this fuckin retared moron started chatting with himself hahahahah and he thinks hes funny...poor guy he thinks hes important and he dont realize that he doesnt have a life typing on that SCUMBO board 0-24
Fuck you Curt James haahah  fuck you rx hustle

Suggest you switch to grass and lay off the meth.  Scrambles your brain.
9  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: Angry Customer Attacks McDonalds Employees on: July 09, 2014, 02:02:18 AM
I see a humble adobe consisting of steel and concrete in this discerning customer's future.
10  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: I should have sued MLB for $10 Million like this guy on: July 08, 2014, 10:01:13 AM

You'll need more than your mail order law degree to do that. 
11  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: when you have to piss at night it ruins your sleep on: July 05, 2014, 05:52:54 PM
Meat will only give you diabetes and HELL in you colon. Protein will make your body dump the water at night and you have to pee often at night. Carbs are key so that the body can hold the water at night, if you only eat protein in the evening the water drains from you as you burn through the carbs it releases water. Carbs = health and energy.

Great response.  Too bad it's bullshit.
12  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Is there any bigger circle jerk than Audiophiles on: July 03, 2014, 12:23:34 AM
Revel speakers.  Cary tube monoblocks.  Bryston tube preamp here.

Less gay then BB.

An epic waste of money.
13  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: Feminists Crying, Losing Hoap on: July 02, 2014, 10:29:49 PM
Perhaps ironically, all we're doing is engaging in semantics regarding the word 'contribute.' We can both agree on the above, though.

We can indeed.


Are you referring to Kripke's argument that proper names are rigid designators and that as such, descriptions cannot function as names because they refer contingently? If so, I certainly grasp that -- it is surely Kripke's fundamental point. Nonetheless, Kripke himself asserts that his analysis pertains to "many or most" (N&N, p. 80) uses of names, not all of them: stipulative definitions like 'Jack the Ripper' do use their descriptive content to fix reference. That's the sole point I was making: Kripke's argument, if successful, relegates Russell's theory to a smaller set of successful instances of reference than was commonly supposed, rather than obviating it entirely.

You are right.  I misconstrued your comment.  But Kripke's recommendation for special cases like "Jack the Ripper" is not quite Russell's.  He says that in these cases the meaning is "fixed" by a description in this world, but behaves as a rigid designator in all modal contexts - hence in all possible worlds other than this one.


And I still think that it's possible to amend Russell's Theory in light of Kripke's criticisms: utilizing rigidified descriptions, or developing a 'metadescriptivist' view where there is a 'called gonuclear' or 'referred to as gonuclear' predicate in the description associated with the name. This doesn't explain how said referring occurs, but I think that that should be an issue for pragmatics anyway, not semantics. But that is a different discussion.

Yes, I agree.  In fact there have been numerous attempts to do just that, unfortunately by lesser lights than either Russell or Kripke.  However, Kripke delivered what most agree is a fatal blow to Russell's ideas, which is why I keep harping on proper names.  Russell's position on epistemology was that we directly know only sense data and our own inner mental states, and that knowledge of everything else - all external objects constituting external reality - comes from descriptions - definite and indefinite.  Kripke's work shows that this cannot be true in the case of proper names, and that, as a consequence, we know named objects directly, because the referent of their names is assigned on a case by case basis through human action (communication).  That's his "causal theory of reference", and it does away with the veil of "descriptivism", a pejorative term for Russell's (and Frege's) views of how language refers to reality.


Didn't Fodor famously argue for 'token physicalism'? That position, when applied to our current understanding of mind, entails that all mental states are brain states, just that they have some non-physical properties. What's wrong with that? Don't many cognitive scientists affirm the possibility of artificial or alien intelligence? If so, they seemingly implicitly agree with Fodor since whatever property makes a given mental state the same type of mental state between such entities, it won't be physical: after all, such entities have divergent physical properties (and thus wouldn't share any mental states if mental states' properties were all physical). At least according to one popular construal of the issue.

Fodor thinks (or thought - I am not up on his latest thinking) that type physicalism is false and token physicalism (as you describe it) is true.  That leaves him with the problem of what to replace type physicalism with (he can't use dispositions, because he rejects the behaviorism of Skinner and Ryle), so he describes mental states as computational relationships involving inner representations.  That's his version of mentalism, a non-substance mentalism, so to speak. However, it is not clear how to give an account of these inner representations, which he regards as innate.  What are they, if not brain states?  He wants to say that they are not, and his Language of Thought is an attempt to give an account of them and the relationships between them. But there are many problems with the LOT approach, not the least of which is how to relate the LOT to neuroscience.  Neuroscientists are thoroughgoing materialists and do not have much patience for invoking nonmaterial "representations" motivated by (what they view as) outdated philosophical problems.  I am not sure what the connection of all of this to AI or alien minds would be.  

I will say this about Jerry Fodor.  He is an amazing rhetorician, fully the equal of guys like the late, great Christopher Hitchens.  I once attended a seminar he gave while he was at MIT consisting of his exposition of issues he was working on at the time.  His ability to argue against virtually any position was fully on display, and it was something to behold.  He is very quick and has instant access to a seemingly endless store of examples and counter examples that support his positions and attack yours, some of which can be bizarre in the extreme.  At one point he got into a discussion of how one could conceive of "computers made of cream cheese", and somehow made it all seem plausible.  It was only later on, when you tried to rehearse what had happened, that you felt you had been expertly snookered.

Unfortunately, his reputation took a body blow when he collaborated on "What Darwin Got Wrong", which offered criticisms of natural selection that have been roundly rejected by almost everyone.  Still, if you have never heard him speak and you get a chance to attend a Fodor lecture, I think you will find it very worthwhile to see him in action.

I certainly agree that philosophers tend to vastly overrate their importance in determining the nature of reality, especially those who I described as autists obsessively debating retrerche thought experiments -- as if one can discover any fundamental properties of reality by sitting in one's office and contemplating whether Jones with the coins in his pocket really knew whether he got the job or not.

Still, I think that there is some value in such activity: it is explicating the nature of our folk concepts, which is what we use to understand the world outside of science. I use the term 'ethnoscience' to refer to the study of the way we understand the world (different from the study of the way the world actually is) after Chomsky did as such, and I think that the aforementioned philosophical analysis of folk concepts falls under this heading.

And, as we agreed upon above, at least in one field scientists regularly consider philosophical input when it comes to theory advancement. But there is a lot of merit in the Wittgensteinian view you espouse, yeah.

Namaste.   Wink
14  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Is there any bigger circle jerk than Audiophiles on: July 02, 2014, 12:29:56 PM
I've you've never heard expensive, professional grade audio equipment live I can assure you it's light years beyond the best of the Magnolia room at Best Buy.

I've known guys that lived in dumpy apartments who didn't own plates, furniture or that many changes of clothes, but man did they have nice A/V equipment.

Ditto, on your last paragraph.  And, man are they nuts.  The OP is right.  "Audiophile" speaker wire from Monster at $100 or more a set?  And that is at the low end of what you can waste your money on.  Sure, up to a point, a cheap system gets trounced by a more expensive one, but there is a limit to the differences a human ear can detect, and that limit is way below, orders of magnitude below, what you can spend on this junk.
15  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Is there any bigger circle jerk than Audiophiles on: July 02, 2014, 09:02:45 AM
Idiots spending hundreds on speaker cable,thousands on amps and tens of thousands on speakers ,claiming to experience some earth shattering sound that no other fucker can tell the difference from their 10 dollar speaker wire, 400 dollar amp, and 500 dollar speakers.Phrases like amazing soundstage, subtle midrange, earth shaking bass and tight treble make me want to strangle them.It may actually be a gayer hobby than bodybuilding.

I have noticed that this disease seems to mostly or entirely infect males.  Women don't go for this kind of insanity.
16  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Income tax just too damn high at 30 percent on: July 02, 2014, 08:58:33 AM
its funny too i am sorrounded by welfare bums disability fakers and the  like.

one dude i know says "fuck learning man" im like dude one day your daddy isnt gonna pay to fix your truck for you and your disability is gonna be cut hes like "big deal i dont care" im like lol

most people dont realize you gotta spend money to make money, its not that 30 percent is high , only becomes a high number after all the tools and materials that you have to buy to do the job right!
but an income tax for someone like me around 30 percent is insane if you consider all my expenses i have to literally be a super hero and do manual labors around the clock eating a shit ton of food, i have no choice to be beta and go on vacation

The solution is heme iron.  It cures all ills.
17  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: Feminists Crying, Losing Hoap on: July 01, 2014, 11:07:26 PM
1. Semantics is generally considered a branch of linguistics. Philosophers like Russell have made major contributions to semantics in the form of semantic theories for a variegated class of expressions, such as descriptions.

By the "semantics of descriptions", I am referring (1) to the specific issue of how descriptions (as propositional particles) refer to the external world, which is a special case of how language (as propositions) refers to reality, which is what the philosophy of language is all about; and (2) to the problem of how to model descriptions in modal contexts, which, in the case of Russell's treatment of proper names, upended his theory, thanks to Marcus and Kripke.  David Lewis also contributed to this area, with his counterpart alternative to Kripke's possible worlds semantics.  All of this stuff is philosophy of language.  And I believe your own citations support that.  Of course, semantics as the study of how natural languages acquire and sustain meaning in the context of usage by people who write and speak human languages, is a branch of linguistics.  No argument there.  Note that linguists did not participate in any of the above.  Because Russell was not working in linguistics.


I've cited a popular linguistics textbook recognizing the contributions of Russell to semantics -- the book also asserts that semantics is a branch of linguistics, an uncontroversial claim -- thereby meeting your challenge to cite a single linguist (I cited a triplet) recognizing Russell as a contributor. I've pointed you toward hundreds of scholarly citations of Russell's work by linguists. I can direct you to recent linguistic work in semantics adjudicating between Fregean and Russellian theories of the semantics of descriptions, thereby affirming these theories' continued relevance to the field. (p.131) That I can do all of these things is highly suggestive of the fact that Russell in fact contributed to linguistics, whatever journal he originally published in. You haven't presented evidence to the contrary.

You have indeed cited a source, although I believe the source discusses Russell's contributions to the philosophy of language, which in some academic departments (specifically where one of your referenced textbook's authors teaches and at MIT, where Paul Elbourne got his Phd) is taught in the same department as is linguistics. (In the case of MIT, the unification of the graduate programs in linguistics and philosophy was done for budgetary reasons; Chomsky, then chairman of the MIT department of linguistics, agreed to absorb the costs of the philosophy department at a time when it was on financial life support, and for no other reason.)

I do think that linguists reference philosophy of language quite a lot, just in the sense I mentioned.  That does not make philosophers of language contributors to linguistics.  I will grant, as I did implicitly in referring to what has transpired historically and what is true now, that in Russell's time there was a lot of overlap between the fields. But today, if one were to decide between whether to go to graduate school in linguistics or philosophy, the advice on all sides would be to pick linguistics if one's goal is to contribute to modern linguistics. But there are joint departments, and if you are saying that there is overlap, especially in the study of formal languages that Chomsky's generative grammar theories motivate for linguistics, I would have to agree.  But that is like saying that because experimental psychologists use Bayes' theorem, and reference it all the time, that Bayes contributed to psychology.  I took your citation of Russell's work to not be an argument of that sort, since you were, I believe, adducing support for your view that philosophers contribute to science.  So I took "contribute" in the more substantive sense. If all you mean is that the philosophy of language is of interest to linguistics, which regularly cites it and its practitioners in advancing linguistic theory, then I would have to grant you that.

The same argument applies to all the other philosophers who I would assert have contributed to linguistics, e.g., Grice and Austin in pragmatics (another branch of linguistics).

The same point again concerning these two, as was made regarding Russell.


2. Regarding citations: you're right, the fact that Russell's work is so widely cited by linguists doesn't by itself make it a work in linguistics. The fact that it is a work in semantics, a branch of linguistics, does. Independent of the label we apply to it, it is clearly a contribution to the scientific study of language, as evinced by (1).

You can just Google Russell in the discussed context.  The semantics of descriptions is a topic in the philosophy of language.  Although Wittgenstein did discuss the semantics of natural languages quite a bit.  Note that in the "Tractatus" he discusses semantics in the philosophical sense, and in "Philosophical Investigations" he does so with respect to its sense in linguistics.  


3. Kripke attacked Russell's theory of descriptions as applied to names, and even then he recognized it would be true of names at least some of the time (see his discussion of 'Jack the Ripper'). He and the other philosophers you mention discuss names, whereas I am discussing Russell's semantic theory of descriptions more generally. Or did Lewis have some theory of descriptions I'm not aware of?

You miss his point. That Russell's treatment of proper names is only true some of the time is the problem with it, and Kripke's possible worlds semantics for modal logic ("semantics" in the philosophical sense) shows this to be the case.  Lewis provided an alternative semantics with his counterpart theory.  

Well, you're free to ask them whether, e.g., Modularity of Mind counts as a contribution to cognitive science or not.

The problem with Fodor is his non-physicalism, as stated.  Scientists these days are materialists, at least with respect to their specific fields, whatever their beliefs generally.  

We agree on this matter.

Given that we agree on that, would you then say that philosophy also has made contributions to physics?  Not counting when physics was called "natural philosophy", as it was in Newton's day.  Would you say that Albert Einstein, because he wrote quite a bit on philosophical topics, was a contributor to modern philosophy? I would say No to all of that, as would most scientists (especially physicists), but I do think some philosophers would disagree. However, I'm with Wittgenstein, Hawking, and Weinberg in their view that philosophers generally play language games and have abdicated their historical role in understanding reality to science, to which they now make no material contributions of any kind.  

18  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: True Getbig wristwatches? on: July 01, 2014, 04:10:14 PM
I'll bet it only cost them $20 to get this picture of Lou wearing a $50 Invicta.
19  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: True Getbig wristwatches? on: July 01, 2014, 04:07:37 PM
I was expecting something along the lines of...

Rolex Sea Dweller
Omega Seamaster Planet Ocean 45mm
Panerai Luminor Marina
IWC Portuguese
Bell & Ross BR-03
U-Boat Flightdeck
Tag Heuer Monaco Steve McQueen

.... etc


And now you know that you were expecting too much...
20  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: apples or oranges on: July 01, 2014, 09:13:50 AM
even tho zane is at the end of his era he looks pretty wicked still on conditioning and of the best..

Zane had a classic look, characterized by balance and symmetry and leanness.   He really made the most of his structure.  I think he used steroids, as all of the Arnold "era" champions did.  But he obviously did so conservatively and intelligently.  On the other hand, he lacked size.  

Today. among too many, it's go for broke with respect to size.  And no holds barred in using any and all chemical shortcuts to get there.  And, yes, that does work, for a while.  But you then pay the price - Palumboism, cancer, heart disease, etc.  Anyone who thinks that is a worthwhile tradeoff needs psychiatric help, quite apart from the unbalanced and "pneumatic" look that characterizes the later Olympia contenders.
21  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: George Zimmerman Loses NBC Defamation Suit on: July 01, 2014, 02:23:29 AM
Fixed for accuracy

Bullshit branded as such ("for accuracy").
22  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: Feminists Crying, Losing Hoap on: July 01, 2014, 01:44:01 AM
In their popular introduction to linguistics, Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication, linguists Adrian Akmajian, Richard Demers, and Robert Harnish appropriately call Russell's Theory of Descriptions "by far the most influential theory of the semantics of definite descriptions," (p. 259) a fact anyone who has taken a few linguistics courses can confirm. Fittingly enough, the only viable alternative theory of the semantics of descriptions is also from a philosopher: Gottlob Frege (who, unlike Russell, thought that descriptions presupposed rather than asserted the existence of the entities described).

You can confirm the Theory's continuing influence by looking at how often "On Denoting" -- the paradigmatic presentation of the Theory -- is still cited by linguists to this day (yes, many of the citations linked to are philosophical journals. But many more are linguistic journals).

This is an interesting exposition. Fodor is generally considered the primary proponent of token physicalism, a doctrine which states (very roughly) that whilst any given concrete particular is physical, it may possess non-physical properties. Fodor applies this doctrine to the mind and suggests that whilst any particular mental state is a physical state, it will possess non-physical properties, viz., certain causal properties that relate it to other computational states of the brain. So you must have some stricter definition of 'physicalism' in mind when you assert that Fodor is a 'mentalist' rather than a physicalist. I agree with you, however, that this particular aspect of Fodor's work -- and philosophy of mind more generally -- doesn't impress cognitive scientists.

That said, I encourage any observers to browse through the 10,000+ citations of Fodor's Modularity of Mind and assess how many of them are bonafide cognitive scientific work vs. obscure philosophical work. In addition, feel free to ask any cognitive scientist about the work's influence (just email professors at your local department pretending to be an "interested student.").

That's one way to define a contribution, sure. But to argue any further on this point is to engage in mere semantics: we will really just be asserting our preferred definitions of the word. So I will disengage on this point.


The book you cite references Russell's work in the philosophy of language and it is as a contribution to that field that Russell's theory is characterized.  All theories of the "semantics of descriptions" are the work of philosophers, because the named topic is one in the philosophy of language, not in linguistics itself.  It is also false that the only viable alternative to Russell is Frege; there are competing theories by Saul Kripke, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and David Lewis.  The conventional wisdom is in fact that Kripke's new theory of reference, presented in his 1980 "Naming and Necessity", refutes Russell's theory, first published in "On Denoting" in 1905.  Russell's work was published in "Mind", a philosophical journal.  Further, because a linguistics text references it, does not make it a work in linguistics.  Similarly, because Thomas Kuhn, a philosopher of science, references the contributions to physics of Einstein and Newton in his "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (a work in the philosophy of science), that obviously does not mean that either Newtonian mechanics or Relativity are contributions to the philosophy of science.  

References to Russell's work

And many philosophy journals reference works in history, physics, linguistics, etc., but that just means that these works are relevant to what is being discussed; it does not make the works so referenced "contributions" to philosophy. The philosophy of language is relevant to linguistics, much as the philosophy of science is relevant to science.  But they are not the same subject, and contributions to one are not contributions to the other. NB, that none of the many published criticisms of "On Denoting" come from linguists, unless, as in the case of Robert Harnish, they hold a chair in both linguistics and philosophy (as did Noam Chomsky).  The fact that Russell's treatment of proper names was refuted by Kripke had no impact on linguistics.


There is nothing obscure about Jerry Fodor.  He is justly famous.  As a philosopher, not a colleague of cognitive scientists, none of whom are mentalists in any sense.  They may indeed know of his work, but I believe all of them would characterize such work as contributions to the philosophy of mind, where the mentalist/materialist battle - long won by the physicalists in cognitive science - still rages. One of the many reasons why most scientists no longer take philosophy seriously.

Defining what a contribution to science is

Well, forgive me, but I presented my "definition" to clarify that I was not defining "contribution to science" in the narrow way which you suggested was the sense I meant.  You may have a different definition, but it surely cannot be just the production of empirical data.  You must agree with that, irrespective of any quibbles about my attempt at a broader and more accurate definition.  Which is the kind of definition I took you to mean when you touted the contributions to science of the philosophers you name.  None of whom made any such contributions.
23  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: Feminists Crying, Losing Hoap on: June 30, 2014, 03:45:18 PM
Man, I got some reading to catch up on.  About 20 years worth.  Sad  Probably shouldn't throw my hat into this particular ring.  But what the hell.

Well, yeah, of course.  Dr Frankenstein wasn't concerned with non-observable elements either.  

Can we find some middle ground and agree that the supra-scientific debate and the temperance it suggests is a contribution to science in itself?  Or, if I'm gonna push my luck with the lab coat types, that science is conducted under the auspice of philosophy and an effort to divorce the two or clearly distinguish them from one another is wasted?

Continental (eg, European except for those in the UK) philosophers might agree with your last statement, but Anglo-American (UK, US, and Australian) philosophers would not.   And most scientists would not.

Graduate study in philosophy only equips you to teach/conduct research in philosophy.  And philosophy these days is a very ingrown and self-absorbed field.  Unfortunately.

But the specific point made in my post is a more narrow one concerning the claimed contributions to science of the philosophers mentioned.  They have not contributed to science, although all have taken scientific findings into account in their philosophical work, which is to their credit. 
24  Getbig Main Boards / Gossip & Opinions / Re: Ronnie Coleman: Tales of the Unexpected by Peter McGough on: June 29, 2014, 11:53:52 PM
Muscle on top of muscle the greatest freak of all time.

Dig the ballooning waist.  Palumboism coming on strong.
25  Getbig Main Boards / General Topics / Re: Feminists Crying, Losing Hoap on: June 29, 2014, 11:38:47 PM
Engineer crying, losing hoap.

U mad that us philosophy grads score higher on the GRE and make substantive contributions to science through theory development and the ethnoscientific, a priori conceptual analysis of folk concepts while u mash out code? U mad?

Oh, you're a philosophy fraud, I mean "grad".  That explains a lot.
Pages: [1] 2 3 ... 28
Theme created by Egad Community. Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Powered by SMF 1.1.16 | SMF © 2011, Simple Machines Valid XHTML 1.0! Valid CSS!