Prompt and rapid withdrawal? The favorite option of the left would make the U.S. pain go away and is perfect for campaign talking points, but it will neither end the war nor help our allies in the region. It is hard to see how it is even remotely in U.S. or Iraqi interests. The recent, authoritative National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's stability said rapid withdrawal "almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation." The NIE goes on to say that neighboring countries might intervene and that massive casualties and refugees would result.
Full Iraqization? As the surge ages or unravels, our planners might want to craft an option that puts more weight on the Iraqis and gradually reduces U.S. force levels. This option would move U.S. combat forces out of cities and feature the steady buildup of Iraqi forces. The U.S. would abandon offensive counterinsurgency operations and shift its main effort to equipping and advising Iraqi forces, while also maintaining maneuver units to protect those advisers or prevent the Iraqi regime from suffering serious defeats.
To succeed, this plan would require a force of about 32,000 troops in Iraq, as well as a regional stability force of 35,000 troops in Kuwait. Along with regional air and naval assets, forces in Iraq would be divided into an advisory element of 10,000 officers, NCOs and civilians to train and advise Iraqi military and police forces; an in-country protection and support force of three mobile brigades (roughly 15,000 troops) to serve as in extremis combat force and as a second line of U.S. protection for advisers and reconstruction teams; a 2,000-soldier Special Forces element to combat foreign terrorists in Iraq; and a 5,000-person headquarters, logistics and air-support element.
Regardless of strategic options, the U.S. should step up diplomacy with its friends in the region. Specifically, the U.S. could ask them for more help in training Iraqi police and military forces and participation in the regional stability force in Kuwait. We should also talk directly to Iran and Syria, but it won't be pleasant. Allowing insurgents, Iranian special forces, or weapons and explosives to cross into Iraq is beyond the pale and, when verified, should become the subject of immediate, proportional counteraction by the coalition.
With this new plan, the U.S. could work toward its goals, reduce its forces in Iraq by two-thirds, cut its regional troop commitment by half, markedly reduce casualties and equipment losses and pressure regional allies to take up some of the slack. The Iraqis would be forced to seek rapid, effective sectarian reconciliation. This post-surge plan could be easily sustained, reduced in size or reinforced, as the situation warrants
Yes this was lenghy but its a plan and appears to be better then anythinmg that politicos on either side have articulated. I figured I let u all chew over this.
