Seven Questions: When Nuri Met Barack
Posted July 2008
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki set off an international media firestorm when he appeared to endorse Barack Obama’s timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. What was Maliki up to, and is he really strong enough to stand on his own? To find out, FP caught up with McClatchy reporter Nancy Youssef in Baghdad.
Foreign Policy: You just returned to Baghdad after a stint in Washington. How long were you gone, and what differences are you seeing now on the ground?
Nancy Youssef: I was last here in December, and I came back on the first of July, and the difference has been really remarkable. The security situation is definitely better, but there’s still this sort of patina of angst over Baghdad. There’s a real concern among people: They want to embrace the new security situation, and yet they don’t know how long it’s going to last. They don’t know what role the U.S. forces are going to play, what role the Iraqi security forces are going to play, what’s going to happen if [radical Shiite leader] Moqtada al-Sadr ends his ceasefire and tells his forces to fight again. It’s a city that’s sort of adjusting to the peace and trying to figure out how long this will last and who will keep it going.
FP: There’s been a debate in the media about how much credit should be given to “the surge” for what you’re seeing now. Barack Obama said it was just one of several factors that helped improve the security situation. Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, didn’t even credit the addition of U.S. troops in his recent interview with Der Spiegel. Meanwhile, John McCain gives the surge the lion’s share of the credit. Who do you think is right?
NY: When you ask the Iraqis here, they say that the added U.S. forces were a part of it, but what really turned things around was the Sahwa movement [of former insurgents switching sides], Moqtada’s ceasefires, and in their minds, Basra. Basra was the first Iraqi-led success story, and it really changed the momentum. So, the Iraqis that we talk to see it as a complex equation with the U.S. troop surge as just one factor. And frankly, the situation on the ground suggests that they’re right, because the surge troops have left, and the security situation remains better.
FP: Before the Basra operation, the consensus about Maliki was that he was a weak leader in the mold of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, his predecessor. Has that perception changed?
NY: I think right now it pivots on two things that are related, which is Basra and the provincial elections. When Basra happened it was inconceivable that the Iraqi government forces would prevail—with or without U.S. help. The fear was that the Mahdi Army and the other militiamen there would overtake the Iraqi security forces, and that they would be in control of the city. Maliki was said to be launching this not out of a security concern, but because he wanted to move against Moqtada al-Sadr in time for the fall-scheduled provincial elections. So, when Basra went well, albeit with U.S. help, people started looking at everything differently. It wasn’t until Basra that there was this drumbeat of Iraqi politicians and citizens alike saying, “We need a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.”
FP: It now looks like the provincial elections are going to be delayed. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
NY: It fundamentally changes Iraq, because everybody was electioneering and politicking toward this fall, and suddenly that disappeared. It puts everything up in the air again. I think if you’re Maliki, you’re really disappointed that the elections are delayed because you’ve got such strong momentum going, and who knows how long that will last? If you’re the Shiite politicians of [the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council], you’re happy that they were delayed. So, I think it depends on whom you ask. But more importantly, this completely changes the political dynamic in Iraq. Everything will operate differently.
FP: How so? How will things be different?
NY: Because before, Maliki was doing things based on the provincial election. He was appealing to his base. He was trying to show effective leadership; he was trying to give people a reason to vote for him. For example, his call for a timeline. Many here believe he was doing it to take that card away from Sadr. Moqtada al-Sadr’s trump card has always been a drawdown of American troops, a timeline for withdrawal. Now, will Maliki be as aggressive if there are no provincial elections this fall? Nobody knows. Will his popularity wane? Will it give more time for the Sadrists to reorganize themselves and reemerge in another way? And in the Sunni areas, a lot of those local tribesmen, those local leaders who emerged out of the surge strategy if you will, they really wanted a legitimate voice in government. Will they have the patience now to wait until next year? Everything is up for grabs all of a sudden.
FP: You mentioned Maliki’s comments, which made headlines around the world when he appeared to more or less endorse Barack Obama’s withdrawal plan. You obviously think that Maliki is playing Iraqi politics here. Is it possible that he’s also playing U.S politics?
NY: He’s trying to take advantage of the election season, so yes, absolutely he is. I think that’s why minutes after he meets with Obama, his spokesman comes out and gives a statement. I don’t think it was a coincidence. I think they took advantage of the international spotlight and used it as an opportunity to once again say, “We want a drawdown date. We want a withdrawal date.”
FP: Do you think that Maliki is overestimating his ability to keep things under control as U.S. forces draw down?
NY: When I was embedded with Iraqi troops in Amarah, in the south, they didn’t fire one shot. They made maybe a handful of arrests. They didn’t find any real Mahdi Army leaders. They’re knocking down open doors, so it’s not surprising that things are going well. The Mahdi Army has fled.
What happens when they come back? Can the Iraqi Army take charge? And the truth is right now, nobody knows. But I tell you, having embedded with the Iraqi Army, they are worried about it. They know that the wins in Basra and Sadr City and in Amarah did not happen because they were outfighting the militiamen. It was because Moqtada al-Sadr said “Don’t fight,” and most of those militiamen fled. What happens when they inevitably come back? How confident can we be that the security gains are sustainable when the Iraqi Army has to face a real fight? And nobody knows the answer.
Nancy Youssef is the chief Pentagon correspondent for McClatchy newspapers.
