Russia deliberately provoked the war in Georgia as part of a wider
strategy of bringing ex-Soviet states to heel, writes Daragh McDowell
YES: THE GEORGIAN attack on Tskhinvali, the "capital" of the
self-declared republic of South Ossetia on the night of August 7th, was
the trigger for the horrifying events we are witnessing in the
Caucasus. It also marked the beginning of serious coverage of the
conflict in the western media. Its previous neglect has meant that the
full story of the run-up to this war has been obscured.
After the Soviet Union's collapse, the newly independent state of
Georgia began to chart a foreign policy course towards the West. It
refused to join the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that
Russia hoped to use to maintain its glavniy (primacy) in the
post-Soviet "near abroad" (to use the Russian terminology) . Moscow
refused to accept Georgia's right to remain outside the CIS, and began
arming and supporting separatist groupings in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as a means of destabilising the Tbilisi government and forcing
it into compliance.
The plan worked, creating two so-called "frozen conflicts" on
Georgian territory. Russia used these to place military forces on
Georgian territory under the guise of "peacekeepers" , to extend its
influence. Since then, Russia has made little secret of its desire to
annex the two breakaway regions, dismembering Georgia and undermining
its independence. This strategy of "armed suasion" as the Russian
defence establishment called it, was also used in the Transdniestrian
region of Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan - two countries
that showed unwillingness to bend to Moscow's will once they achieved
independence.
This situation has become increasingly intolerable for Georgia over
the past few years. In the Rose Revolution of 2003, its people removed
the discredited Eduard Shevardnadze from power and replaced him with
Mikheil Saakashvili. They gave him a mandate to reunify the country and
to reorient its foreign policy away from Russia. Putin and his cabal of
siloviki (former security-service apparatchiks) despise Saakashvili
and, as a result, have spent the last five years attempting to secure
his downfall, and to end Georgian defiance.
The recognition of Kosovan independence by the West earlier this year
convinced the Kremlin to increase the tempo of its plans for Georgia.
The Russians began taking steps towards recognition of Abkhaz and South
Ossetian independence as well as increasing economic and military aid.
It issued Russian passports and citizenship in both regions in
preparation for formal annexation and, as we now know, as a cynical
means of manufacturing a casus belli. Over the past few months, Russian
fighters have invaded Georgian airspace, destroyed Georgian
reconnaissance drones and dropped dummy bombs in an attempt to provoke
a Georgian response.
In the week leading up the invasion, South Ossetian forces, backed by
Russia, initiated a "sniper war" against Georgia, firing on its towns
with mortars and small arms. A unilateral ceasefire declared by
Saakashvili on the night of August 7th was ignored by the other side.
Faced with few other options to defend his country and its citizens,
Saakashvili made the fateful decision to invade. He was foolish to walk
into an obvious Russian trap. This raises questions about his
leadership, but he faced a Russian act of aggression.
If all this was not enough to serve as proof of Russia's intentions,
the conduct of the war should be. Russian forces have moved well beyond
the original conflict zone, opening a second front in Abkhazia and
moving into Georgia proper. They have initiated a de facto naval
blockade and invaded the strategic towns of Poti and Gori. They have
demanded effective annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the
price of peace. They plan to remove Georgia's legitimate government and
again make it a vassal state. While Russia has made bloodcurdling
claims of Georgian war crimes, the only independent investigation at
time of writing (by Human Rights Watch) has found evidence only of
ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and of Russian use of cluster munitions against Georgian civilians.
Russia has poured hundreds, if not thousands, of irregulars, modern-day
Black and Tans, into Georgia to spread terror and chaos.
Finally, Russia has inserted into Georgian territory two SS-21
"Scarab" short-range missile launchers. The only possible use for these
in a conflict of this type is for delivery of tactical nuclear weapons.
They are Russia's insurance policy, deterring those who would come to
Georgia's aid to prevent it being torn asunder by the Kremlin's war
machine.
This was a calculated, deliberate war of aggression initiated by
Moscow. Russia's actions over the past week were designed to
demonstrate to its other former dominions that dissent will not be
tolerated, that those who do not accept Russian glavniy (such as
Ukraine or the Baltic states) will suffer a similar fate. While
formulating its response, Europe would do well to remember that.
Daragh McDowell is a doctoral student researching post-Soviet foreign
policy at the University of Oxford. He blogs at
_www.armthepeasants .blogspot. com
