the cocksuckers got their Patriot Act, their war in Iraq, and now they've found another way to stick it to you.
All the neocon cocksuckers on this board are probably pretty pleased about it.
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/luigi.zingales/Why_Paulson_is_wrong.pdf
good article and the author makes a point that I've mentioned before.
We now have a system of socialism where losses are socialized while profits are privatized.
Have we already forgotten that this bailout is the brainchild of Henry Paulson who formerly ran Goldman Sachs, a firm who created 100 billion+ of CDO's (the very toxic debt we are not supposed to buy using our tax dollars) while at the same time also shorting the very shit that they were peddling out the front door?
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/business/02every.html?dlbkCiting a recent piece in Fortune, Mr. Stein notes that as
Goldman was peddling collateralized mortgage obligations, it was also shorting the junk on a titanic scale through index sales — showing, he argues, how horrible a product it believed it was selling.And, says Mr. Stein, Goldman was doing this for years. Indeed, he notes the bank as one of the top 10 sellers of C.M.O.’s for the last two and a half years. It might have sold very roughly $100 billion of the stuff in that period, according to financial Web site ABAlert. Goldman was doing it on a scale of billions even when Henry M. Paulson Jr., the current Treasury secretary, led the firm.
Furthermore, he notes, Goldman was continuing to underwrite junk mortgage issues even as one of it’s leading economists Jan Hatzius, who recently rang the panic bell on the mortgage mess, was saying housing was in trouble. This begs the question, he argues, of whether Dr. Hatzius’s recent paper — which argued that losses in subprime and elsewhere that are taken at banks ultimately boomerang back — was a device to help along the goal of success at bearish trades in this sector and in the market generally.
All of this leads Mr. Stein to conclude that the recent unhappiness about mortgages and Goldman’s connection with them are not examples of sterling conduct.
It is bad enough to have been selling this stuff, he writes, but it is far worse when the sellers were, in effect, simultaneously shorting the stuff they were selling, or making similar bets.
