History never went away
Fyodor Lukyanov
The cliche, currently in vogue, to describe events in our times as "the return of history" is a staggering example of western arrogance. Taken literally, it means everything that took place in the 1990s was not history: the tragic breakup of multinational states, accompanied by civil wars and millions of broken lives; the massacre in Rwanda; the triumph of obscurantism in Afghanistan and the religious and political rise of the developing world; the bombings of Belgrade and Baghdad; nuclear proliferation; and so on. But of course, "history" is made only in the Euro-Atlantic space, whereas everything else is part of a fringe world.
When the west scored an unexpected victory in its confrontation with the Soviet Union, it, like Dr Faust, wanted a moment to last forever and declared the end of history. But, as in Goethe's tragedy, this feeling proved, in fact, to be a demonic temptation. This is not "the return of history," which actually never went away, but a specific problem of whether the US retains the global leadership it received after the Cold War.
US foreign policy traditionally embraces a messianic approach; in image, guided not by selfish national interests but by ideas of freedom and democracy shaped since the its very first days. In the 20th century, this image was further corroborated during the two world wars when America came to Europe's rescue to save it from another catastrophe.
After the Soviet Union ceased to exist, America for the first time in history had a taste of global domination, and September 11 gave a boost to the creation of an integral military-ideological strategy. Never before had measures to ensure the security of one country been global in nature. Washington raised the prospect of building a world order that would never again pose a threat to the US.
By proliferating democracy around the world, the US could ensure its own military, economic and energy security. Thus ideology merged with geostrategic tasks. Democracy turned into an instrument. The pompous words about freedom and human rights quickly began to lose any sense.
However, by the time America formed a comprehensive view on global leadership, it could no longer act regardless of what others might think. International influence began to shift to Asia; Russia recovered from its geopolitical knockout; and even US allies began to express doubts.
The hegemon's trap is that the leader has no right to retreat even on minor issues. The inability to uphold one's positions in a peripheral region may have a domino effect. "Swaps" with other actors are not provided for, as the global leader has no minor interests that it could waive.
As a result, for example, the desire of a strengthened Russia to discuss spheres of interests and even its readiness to make concessions on some issues runs against the US's categorical unwillingness to move. When George Bush and Condoleezza Rice speak about the inadmissibility of a policy for delimiting spheres of influence, they mean it. From their point of view, there is only one sphere of influence – the American one, which embraces the whole world.
Therefore, the growth of the ambitions of any country poses a threat to America, which it must neutralise. This may be the build-up of China's economic might; Europe's feeble attempts to formulate an independent political identity; or Russia's desire to restore its position in Eurasia.
Of course, threats are not necessarily neutralised by force; this can be done by means of a new system of interaction. But practice shows that force is given preference here. The reanimation of the factor of military force in world politics and the degradation of all international institutions, ranging from the UN and the IMF to Nato and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are the fruits of America's leadership.
It would not be fair to blame the US alone for this, as all these organisations are the legacy of the previous epoch. They should have passed into history together with it and given way to something else. However, the "new world order" proposed by the cold war winners provided not for the creation of new structures but for the extension of the former western organisations to the whole world. But these organisations proved to be unfit for global functions.
Discussions in the west pivot on one idea – how to ensure western leadership in the new conditions. A global "concert of powers", which would provide for the equal participation of all influential actors in the formulation of new rules of the game, is not even discussed. The best they are offered is to discuss terms on which they would recognise the west's supremacy and benefit from that.
The return of the US from the hyperpower category into the ranks of great powers, which have a very great, yet not dominant influence on international relations, would be a step towards the restoration of balance in the world. This would require from Washington the formulation of its own national interests and the development of a system of priorities. However, attempts to retain hegemony at any cost, amidst institutional chaos, imbalance of power and the growing ambitions of other countries, would bring about new and increasingly dangerous conflicts.
