jesus, thats some foolish shit right there.
i take it that you have not read his philosophy. you should. heres a snippet:
<Phil>. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse
proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you
defined to be, <the things we immediately perceive by our
senses>. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as
distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at
all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to
have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and
assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But
what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a
loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that
heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities
which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the
mind?
and another
<Phil>. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible
quality, or made up of sensible qualities?
<Hyl>. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?
<Phil>. My reason for asking was, because in saying, <each
visible object hath that colour which we see in it>, you make
visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either
that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that
there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight:
but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still
maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your
<corporeal substance> is nothing distinct from <sensible
qualities>. {184}