The Almighty Morality Debate

[syntaxmachine]

One segment of the 'bible on homosexuality' thread dealt with the status of morality. Id like to isolate that topic and hopefully flesh it out a bit.

A good way to do this is to issue a challenge: as a moral skeptic I see no adequate definition of morality and challenge anyone to assert two things:

1. That an adequate definition exists (maybe you can tell us what it is as well)

2. That your proposed definition actually exists in our world

It seems weve got a few camps thus far: the religious, led by Beach_Bum , havent given a definition thus far, and the only arguments have been 'if you disagree with me you're dumb because it is obvious I'm right.' Sorry, but this doesnt count as an argument. This plus the fact that this view necessitates positing an unfalsifiable deity means it comes in dead last in the conversation thus far.

More plausibly, avxo has argued that morals are principles societies agree upon that guide human behavior. This is good but not good enough, because it fails to distinguish morals from other principles. What makes morals different from the principles that guide the behavior of members of a chess club? Unless you want to say they are exactly the same, you have to explain the specialness of moral principles.

Finally, my view (the most reasonable) is that science shows there is no magical thing called morality. We only need to cite the emotions evolution has imbued us with to explain the feelings of rightness and wrongness, with culture shaping these feelings to some significant extent. Nowhere do magical properties or forces ('good,' 'evil,' 'right,' 'wrong' and so forth) enter the picture. This also explains why moral disagreements are never resolved rationally (unlike disagreements in, say, history or science): there isnt an objectively correct answer to settle upon!

[OzmO]

I would like to submit the "Victim Principle" for testing.

Generally, if someone is harmed through no choice of their own it is morally wrong.  This would include rape, theft, murder, imprisonment, oppression, adultery, etc.  This would not include choosing to harm one's self.

 ( I am interested to see the arguments against it as i know something like this couldn't have been never been explored before)
  

[Man of Steel]

How did our consciousness evolve?

[loco]

One segment of the 'bible on homosexuality' thread dealt with the status of morality. Id like to isolate that topic and hopefully flesh it out a bit.

A good way to do this is to issue a challenge: as a moral skeptic I see no adequate definition of morality and challenge anyone to assert two things:

1. That an adequate definition exists (maybe you can tell us what it is as well)

2. That your proposed definition actually exists in our world

It seems weve got a few camps thus far: the religious, led by Beach_Bum , havent given a definition thus far, and the only arguments have been 'if you disagree with me you're dumb because it is obvious I'm right.' Sorry, but this doesnt count as an argument. This plus the fact that this view necessitates positing an unfalsifiable deity means it comes in dead last in the conversation thus far.

More plausibly, avxo has argued that morals are principles societies agree upon that guide human behavior. This is good but not good enough, because it fails to distinguish morals from other principles. What makes morals different from the principles that guide the behavior of members of a chess club? Unless you want to say they are exactly the same, you have to explain the specialness of moral principles.

Finally, my view (the most reasonable) is that science shows there is no magical thing called morality. We only need to cite the emotions evolution has imbued us with to explain the feelings of rightness and wrongness, with culture shaping these feelings to some significant extent. Nowhere do magical properties or forces ('good,' 'evil,' 'right,' 'wrong' and so forth) enter the picture. This also explains why moral disagreements are never resolved rationally (unlike disagreements in, say, history or science): there isnt an objectively correct answer to settle upon!

An adequate definition for morality?  You are asking the wrong question.

Morality is the principle by which we know what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil, not necessarily what is legal and what is illegal. 

If I'm eating an XL pizza right next to a poor, hungry child and I don't share with him, it is not illegal.  However, it is immoral, at least according to most people in today's society.  By what principle do they determine that it is immoral?  That is the question.

So the right question is what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil?  Who decides that?

[syntaxmachine]

An adequate definition for morality?  You are asking the wrong question.

Morality is the principle by which we know what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil, not necessarily what is legal and what is illegal.  

If I'm eating an XL pizza right next to a poor, hungry child and I don't share with him, it is not illegal.  However, it is immoral, at least according to most people in today's society.  By what principle do they determine that it is immoral?  That is the question.

So the right question is what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil?  Who decides that?

What you've done here is provide a definition of morality, therefore affirming my original question. We have to settle upon some sort of definition in order to get the project off the ground.

What I'm asking us to do is find some adequate meanings for such words as "right" and "wrong" before we jump into the world and start judging things as right and wrong. Doesn't it make sense to understand the words one is using before making them indispensable?

A logical response is, "Maybe I don't have an adequate definition but I know it when I see it," as in the case of your example of eating a pizza by a starving child. But this just isn't right, because all we need to explain the feeling of wrongness we have given this situation is an understanding of the evolution of feelings, i.e., the evolution of morality. In other words, we never need to cite anything called "wrongness" to explain the situation, just our psychology. We feel a certain way given your example, but that doesn't mean there is any magical property called "wrong" there.

And that's the whole point, I've never seen an adequate explanation of these supposed moral properties that can't be reduced to an individual's psychology. They are totally dispensable and can be gotten rid of with no adverse affects.

[syntaxmachine]

I would like to submit the "Victim Principle" for testing.

Generally, if someone is harmed through no choice of their own it is morally wrong.  This would include rape, theft, murder, imprisonment, oppression, adultery, etc.  This would not include choosing to harm one's self.

 ( I am interested to see the arguments against it as i know something like this couldn't have been never been explored before)
  

Most people will find the victim principle agreeable, at first glance. It can run into complications (just like any other moral principle) in specific situations, however. For example, is it morally wrong to incarcerate criminals? They are harmed by it and it is against their choice. Your principle seems to imply we can only ever punish people and be right if we have their consent!

Also, I wonder what you can say to someone who simply denies your principle. If they say, "I don't think that's right," what reason can you give them to suppose the principle is real and objectively true rather than something that sounds good?

[OzmO]

Good point, however, punishment is something that is enacted after a transgression and is a consequence.

For example when a person is part of a society that person knows the laws of that society which is a punishment for victimizing someone.  At that point his rights are forfeit to an extent. 

And.....Basically a punishment for breaking a moral is a separate issue as many laws are based on morals. 

On the second point, loved it.  It doesn't matter what a person thinks or not.  On a person to person level Harming someone against their will is wrong

[avxo]

An adequate definition for morality?  You are asking the wrong question.

Morality is the principle by which we know what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil, not necessarily what is legal and what is illegal.

Morality is the set of codes and values that someone uses to guide his choices and actions, and by which one sorts the options available to him, using as metric the degree to which they achieve the code’s standards of value. So, then, morality is a set of abstract principles, which is applied against specific actions.

If I'm eating an XL pizza right next to a poor, hungry child and I don't share with him, it is not illegal.  However, it is immoral, at least according to most people in today's society.  By what principle do they determine that it is immoral?  That is the question.

Why is it immoral to not share food with the hungry kid that's right next to you? Would it make a difference if the kid was, say, across the street?

So the right question is what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil?  Who decides that?

You operate under the assumption that things are inherently good or inherently evil. This is a misconception: good and evil aren't absolute attributes. They are convenient words that we use to mean "achieves the goals of a particular moral code" and so what is "good" to me might be "bad" to you if our moral codes aren't compatible. If I am a soldier fighting for my country, killing one enemy soldier is good and killing a hundred is great. As a soldier of the opposing army, you are unlikely to agree with that assessment though.

[loco]

Morality is the set of codes and values that someone uses to guide his choices and actions, and by which one sorts the options available to him, using as metric the degree to which they achieve the code’s standards of value. So, then, morality is a set of abstract principles, which is applied against specific actions.


Why is it immoral to not share food with the hungry kid that's right next to you? Would it make a difference if the kid was, say, across the street?


You operate under the assumption that things are inherently good or inherently evil. This is a misconception: good and evil aren't absolute attributes. They are convenient words that we use to mean "achieves the goals of a particular moral code" and so what is "good" to me might be "bad" to you if our moral codes aren't compatible. If I am a soldier fighting for my country, killing one enemy soldier is good and killing a hundred is great. As a soldier of the opposing army, you are unlikely to agree with that assessment though.

How is my definition of morality different than yours, other than the fancy words?  You love hearing yourself talk, don't you?

And for the sake of discussion, I made my statements above as neutral as possible without saying what I believe.  As you can read, I wrote that not sharing food with the hungry is immoral "at least according to most people in today's society."  Having problems reading?

And why would it make any difference where the kid is standing?  I simply created a scenario as an example.  The point is that I am aware of the hungry kid and that it is within my reach to share my food with the hungry kid.  

And I operate under no assumption.  "Right", "wrong", "good" and "evil" are words in the English vocabulary and are necessary for English speaking people to communicate.  What is the definition of these words?  I already said that should be the discussion here.

[loco]

What you've done here is provide a definition of morality, therefore affirming my original question. We have to settle upon some sort of definition in order to get the project off the ground.

What I'm asking us to do is find some adequate meanings for such words as "right" and "wrong" before we jump into the world and start judging things as right and wrong. Doesn't it make sense to understand the words one is using before making them indispensable?

A logical response is, "Maybe I don't have an adequate definition but I know it when I see it," as in the case of your example of eating a pizza by a starving child. But this just isn't right, because all we need to explain the feeling of wrongness we have given this situation is an understanding of the evolution of feelings, i.e., the evolution of morality. In other words, we never need to cite anything called "wrongness" to explain the situation, just our psychology. We feel a certain way given your example, but that doesn't mean there is any magical property called "wrong" there.

And that's the whole point, I've never seen an adequate explanation of these supposed moral properties that can't be reduced to an individual's psychology. They are totally dispensable and can be gotten rid of with no adverse affects.

So do you have definitions for "Right", "wrong", "good" and "evil"?

[syntaxmachine]

So do you have definitions for "Right", "wrong", "good" and "evil"?

I think the words don't mean much of anything, and therefore avoid them. Consider them like "floggy" or "boggy," two words I just made up. A theory of good or evil is like a theory of what "boggy" is: the subject matter is non-referential, i.e., there's nothing in the real world that it corresponds to.

Now, I need to explain why the words are so widespread and why people are so convinced they are referential. My explanation for this is that to the extent that the words have meaning, these meanings relate to our feelings in specific situations. So, when we see somebody burning a cat alive, we think "that's WRONG!" But what we're really referring to are our feelings about the event, not anything that exists outside of our heads. Why we have such feelings is pretty handily explained by a combination of evolutionary pressures plus cultural indoctrination.

[syntaxmachine]

How did our consciousness evolve?

No one knows precisely how consciousness came about but seeing as all of our other biological characteristics emerged from the process of evolution, it simply must be that so too did our consciousness (unless you want to proffer another explanation that makes sense).

An evolved trait is either beneficial for the organism or it isn't. The dominant position in evolutionary biology is that the majority of our traits were selected for, i.e., they are actively beneficial for our survival. I accept this and think that the different components that make up consciousness were selected for over hundreds of thousands of years.

Also, an evolved trait may come about suddenly (in relative terms) or evolve very gradually. It is also the dominant position in evolutionary biology that beneficial traits accumulate over time; e.g., vision starts with very basic photoreceptors, and then over time more and more complex functionality is slapped on to that structure until eventually there is an eye there. So too with consciousness; the different specialized brain structures that somehow combine to produce consciousness probably were added bit by bit, increasing the organism's functionality a little bit each time.  This makes sense given the increasing functionality of animals with brains more and more like ours, e.g., mental complexity increases from wasps to cats (wasps have brains but they are so simple that its doubtful they have any mental life at all).

[syntaxmachine]

Morality is the set of codes and values that someone uses to guide his choices and actions, and by which one sorts the options available to him, using as metric the degree to which they achieve the code’s standards of value. So, then, morality is a set of abstract principles, which is applied against specific actions.

This is good but I'm not sure it is complete: if morality is just a set of codes and values that guides a person's actions, how is it different from the sets of rules that a chess club has? Thinkers influenced by Kant like to say that moral rules are somehow very different in kind than normal rules people come up with; do you agree with this or are you ok saying that moral rules are literally no different than a chess club's?

[avxo]

This is good but I'm not sure it is complete: if morality is just a set of codes and values that guides a person's actions, how is it different from the sets of rules that a chess club has? Thinkers influenced by Kant like to say that moral rules are somehow very different in kind than normal rules people come up with; do you agree with this or are you ok saying that moral rules are literally no different than a chess club's?

I don't believe they are, somehow, fundamentally different. Of course, I don't think they're like the rules of a chess club (by which I assume you mean the rules of the game of chess itself) in the sense that when you make up a game, the rules can be arbitrary: nothing inherent in the nature of a rook piece limits it to moving the way rooks move in chess right now, for example.

As I've explained before, I think it's possible to have a morality that is based purely on logic, all the way down to a single axiom. It is in that sense that I think they are both different and similar to other rules. They're different because I believe that such a morality is inherent in our nature. They're the same because like all rules, they must be logically derived and consistent to be useful.

[syntaxmachine]

I don't believe they are, somehow, fundamentally different. Of course, I don't think they're like the rules of a chess club (by which I assume you mean the rules of the game of chess itself) in the sense that when you make up a game, the rules can be arbitrary: nothing inherent in the nature of a rook piece limits it to moving the way rooks move in chess right now, for example.

As I've explained before, I think it's possible to have a morality that is based purely on logic, all the way down to a single axiom. It is in that sense that I think they are both different and similar to other rules. They're different because I believe that such a morality is inherent in our nature. They're the same because like all rules, they must be logically derived and consistent to be useful.

I'm not sure you're seeing the snag here. You're describing moral rules as if they are somehow different from the rules of a chess club (most people agree on this, morals are different from arbitrary human rules), but then not citing the mysterious variable that makes these rules different. They must be different (if they exist at all) because otherwise the chess club rules count as moral rules as well, an absurd outcome.

You say that these rules relate in some important way to an inherent nature. But this is an arbitrary way to delimit moral rules from other rules, and in any case it isn't able to do the heavy lifting you want it to. For example, it is probably a part of our inherent nature (as evinced by the universality of this behavior across cultures) to develop rules for body adornment and meal times. Are rules about breakfast moral or immoral just because they are essential to our nature, as your view necessitates? I dare say they are not.

There are some other problems with your view that you would need to correct to make it plausible, but I'll only mention the biggest: it leads to logical contradiction.

The problem here is that there isn't one singular "human nature." There are shared characteristics (like the meal time rules mentioned above), but not all of the characteristics of any one organism in the species will be shared by other members. In other words, there can be human beings with very different natures. So, a psychopath's axiomatized system for dealing with other people is going to be very different from ours. And thus a statement like "Killing someone for gain is a-ok as long as you can get away with it" will be true in his system and false in ours. Of course, statements are either true or false, not both. It is logically impossible that the statement is both true and false.

[avxo]

I'm not sure you're seeing the snag here. You're describing moral rules as if they are somehow different from the rules of a chess club (most people agree on this, morals are different from arbitrary human rules), but then not citing the mysterious variable that makes these rules different. They must be different (if they exist at all) because otherwise the chess club rules count as moral rules as well, an absurd outcome.

Let me reiterate. I don't think they're any different from human rules, in the sense that they need to be logical. But there is a difference. The difference is that the rules of morality, unlike the rules for chess, need to be derived from something that we do not control: namely our nature. Read on to see what I mean.

You say that these rules relate in some important way to an inherent nature. But this is an arbitrary way to delimit moral rules from other rules, and in any case it isn't able to do the heavy lifting you want it to. For example, it is probably a part of our inherent nature (as evinced by the universality of this behavior across cultures) to develop rules for body adornment and meal times. Are rules about breakfast moral or immoral just because they are essential to our nature, as your view necessitates? I dare say they are not.

I am saying that the rules about whether something is moral or not, ultimately boil down to one thing. I'll quote a bit from Ayn Rand (although I don't necessarily agree with her on everything) since this is almost as close to my own stand on this issue as one can get: "My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists—and in a single choice: to live. The rest proceeds from these. To live, man must hold three things as the supreme and ruling values of his life: Reason—Purpose—Self-esteem. Reason, as his only tool of knowledge—Purpose, as his choice of the happiness which that tool must proceed to achieve—Self-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his mind is competent to think and his person is worthy of happiness, which means: is worthy of living. These three values imply and require all of man’s virtues, and all his virtues pertain to the relation of existence and consciousness: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride."

There are some other problems with your view that you would need to correct to make it plausible, but I'll only mention the biggest: it leads to logical contradiction.

The problem here is that there isn't one singular "human nature." There are shared characteristics (like the meal time rules mentioned above), but not all of the characteristics of any one organism in the species will be shared by other members. In other words, there can be human beings with very different natures. So, a psychopath's axiomatized system for dealing with other people is going to be very different from ours. And thus a statement like "Killing someone for gain is a-ok as long as you can get away with it" will be true in his system and false in ours. Of course, statements are either true or false, not both. It is logically impossible that the statement is both true and false.

You're missing the point. The point isn't what a psychopath will decide about killing. I do not concern myself with the irrational and neither should you. The point is that rationally and objectively initiating the use of force, culminating in the killing of someone is wrong. Why? Because we are beings of volitional consciousness; unlike a plant, that just "functions" we don't. We need to use our mind and exercise our judgement to survive. When faced with force, we are forced to act against our own judgement and mind; we are forced to act against the means of our survival.

[syntaxmachine]

I am saying that the rules about whether something is moral or not, ultimately boil down to one thing. I'll quote a bit from Ayn Rand (although I don't necessarily agree with her on everything) since this is almost as close to my own stand on this issue as one can get: "My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists—and in a single choice: to live. The rest proceeds from these. To live, man must hold three things as the supreme and ruling values of his life: Reason—Purpose—Self-esteem. Reason, as his only tool of knowledge—Purpose, as his choice of the happiness which that tool must proceed to achieve—Self-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his mind is competent to think and his person is worthy of happiness, which means: is worthy of living. These three values imply and require all of man’s virtues, and all his virtues pertain to the relation of existence and consciousness: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride."

1. I'm not familiar with Rand's work, but will try to interpret the position as best as I'm able. Feel free to correct me where I go awry. I'll also ignore some of the superfluous stuff ("existence exists" is a tautology; I don't think Rand intended to say her whole morality boils down to a tautology) and get to the meaty stuff.

2. You say that the rules of morality need to be derived from our nature, and Rand here seems to be saying our nature is such that we are essentially rational beings. So, rules of morality need to be derived from our rationality. Rand also seems to say something to the effect that we are self-interested: that we rationally promote our own self-interest. This seems to be a morality of "egoism," or looking after oneself.

3. This is fine as far as it goes (I'll point out a problem after the next quote), but I'm not sure just how far that is. You see, it still ignores the problems I've been pointing out, i.e., how does one define what a rule about morality is such that it is somehow different from other sorts of rules? I already pointed out rules that derive from our nature that we clearly want to say have nothing to do with morality, e.g., scheduling meal times. Rationality is just the ability to make choices consistent with one's goals; it is not a magical concept that generates a universal morality. For example, Al Qaeda operatives are acting rationally when they blow themselves up, given their all-too-real beliefs in the way martydrom functions and the rewards it bestows.

You're missing the point. The point isn't what a psychopath will decide about killing. I do not concern myself with the irrational and neither should you. The point is that rationally and objectively initiating the use of force, culminating in the killing of someone is wrong. Why? Because we are beings of volitional consciousness; unlike a plant, that just "functions" we don't. We need to use our mind and exercise our judgement to survive. When faced with force, we are forced to act against our own judgement and mind; we are forced to act against the means of our survival.

4. Even when we add the twist about self-interest, this view seems to force us into questionable positions. That's why I mentioned the psychopath. Let's not get into the semantics of whether "psychopath" refers to someone essentially irrational or not; the larger point is that people clearly engage in rational, self-interested behavior that virtually everyone would call morally abhorrent. So, psychopath or not, a person that rationally kills others (let's say a rival for a job opening) in order to advance their goals is acting "morally" according to a rational egoist view. Morality, or what most people would call morality, gets separated from rational self-interest in this example, and many others (the Nazis are probably an example as well; they ruthlessly cut down the competition in order to seize power, i.e., they acted in their own rational self-interest, but no one thereby declares their acts moral). Since the two concepts can be so easily cleaved apart, it is clear that they are not equivalent.

Here's a summary of the problems the view faces:

1. The redefinition of rationality as promotion of one's self-interest is a stipulation and no reason is given for it, as is the attempt to equate morality with rational self-interest. Stipulating a thing's truth isn't the same as giving a reason for its truth.

2. This view still hasn't defined what a moral rule is in a way that escapes obvious counterexamples.

3. This view assumes that there is one human nature that all humans are bestowed with, when evidence seems to indicate that there are people with extremely different natures, not all of whom are rational. The only universally shared characteristic is being derived from a particular offshoot on the tree of life (i.e., a particular stream of genes), not being essentially rational.

4. The view still leads to logical contradiction. When a person flourishes using force (killing) on others in the pursuit of rational self-interest, "truth" attaches to the statement "Killing others is moral." We'd be naive to deny that such human beings exist. At the same time, another person may never use force and the use of that force may hinder them and limit their personal growth. This necessitates that "falsehood" attaches itself to the statement "Killing others is moral." Assuming these people exist at the same time, "Killing is moral" has contradictory values attached to it; it is both true and false. Statements can't be both true and false at the same time; that's just the way logic works. Any view that leads to this conclusion is incoherent. The statement is either true or it isn't. Plus, isn't it weird that whether the statement is true or not depends on whether the given behavior happens to benefit us or not?

5. I'm not sure how speaking of volitional consciousness changes that killing others can promote one's rational self interest, and therefore, on Rand's view, be deemed moral.

[syntaxmachine]

At least the view is an attempt to build a morality without relying on supernaturalism; because of the above problems, however, I'm not sure that it stands the test of reason.

[avxo]

1. I'm not familiar with Rand's work, but will try to interpret the position as best as I'm able. Feel free to correct me where I go awry. I'll also ignore some of the superfluous stuff ("existence exists" is a tautology; I don't think Rand intended to say her whole morality boils down to a tautology) and get to the meaty stuff.

Rand uses "existence exists" as an axiom, from which to base everything else. Her next steps are "something exists which one perceives" and "one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists." You can argue it's a tautology, and I don't necessarily disagree with that statement, but it's certainly an axiomatic statement.

2. You say that the rules of morality need to be derived from our nature, and Rand here seems to be saying our nature is such that we are essentially rational beings. So, rules of morality need to be derived from our rationality. Rand also seems to say something to the effect that we are self-interested: that we rationally promote our own self-interest. This seems to be a morality of "egoism," or looking after oneself.

Right, Rand was a big proponent of a morality of egoism. She argues that the rules of morality need to be such that they "jibe" with our nature, so that a morality that leads us to death is not good.
 

3. This is fine as far as it goes (I'll point out a problem after the next quote), but I'm not sure just how far that is. You see, it still ignores the problems I've been pointing out, i.e., how does one define what a rule about morality is such that it is somehow different from other sorts of rules? I already pointed out rules that derive from our nature that we clearly want to say have nothing to do with morality, e.g., scheduling meal times. Rationality is just the ability to make choices consistent with one's goals; it is not a magical concept that generates a universal morality. For example, Al Qaeda operatives are acting rationally when they blow themselves up, given their all-too-real beliefs in the way martydrom functions and the rewards it bestows.

It doesn't have to be different from all other sorts of rules. Only different from some sorts of rules. We both agree that the rules of, say, chess could be what they are, or they could be something else without any consequences. However, the consequences of a moral rule that says "killing is fine" are different. Sure, a rule about when to eat isn't related to morality. But a rule that says "killing another human being is wrong because initiating the use of force is wrong, because by initiating the use of force you are making someone act against their own rational judgement" is different from a rule that says "eat at 5pm!"

4. Even when we add the twist about self-interest, this view seems to force us into questionable positions. That's why I mentioned the psychopath. Let's not get into the semantics of whether "psychopath" refers to someone essentially irrational or not; the larger point is that people clearly engage in rational, self-interested behavior that virtually everyone would call morally abhorrent. So, psychopath or not, a person that rationally kills others (let's say a rival for a job opening) in order to advance their goals is acting "morally" according to a rational egoist view. Morality, or what most people would call morality, gets separated from rational self-interest in this example, and many others (the Nazis are probably an example as well; they ruthlessly cut down the competition in order to seize power, i.e., they acted in their own rational self-interest, but no one thereby declares their acts moral). Since the two concepts can be so easily cleaved apart, it is clear that they are not equivalent.

I'm not convinced. A person that kills rivals for a job opening isn't acting rationally - or morally. The initiation of force is never rational or moral.

1. The redefinition of rationality as promotion of one's self-interest is a stipulation and no reason is given for it, as is the attempt to equate morality with rational self-interest. Stipulating a thing's truth isn't the same as giving a reason for its truth.

I don't redefine rationality as promotion of self-interest.

2. This view still hasn't defined what a moral rule is in a way that escapes obvious counterexamples.

I haven't seen any counter-examples.

3. This view assumes that there is one human nature that all humans are bestowed with, when evidence seems to indicate that there are people with extremely different natures, not all of whom are rational. The only universally shared characteristic is being derived from a particular offshoot on the tree of life (i.e., a particular stream of genes), not being essentially rational.

Even if our only shared characteristic is being derived from a particular stream of genes, those particular genes are what shapes our nature. If we share them, we share our nature. That doesn't mean that we're all the same. But it does mean that for all of us, logic is our means of acquiring knowledge, for example, and rationality is the means by which we apply knowledge.

Are there those who can't do that for some reason outside of their control? Sure. But what does that prove, if anything?

4. The view still leads to logical contradiction. When a person flourishes using force (killing) on others in the pursuit of rational self-interest, "truth" attaches to the statement "Killing others is moral." We'd be naive to deny that such human beings exist. At the same time, another person may never use force and the use of that force may hinder them and limit their personal growth. This necessitates that "falsehood" attaches itself to the statement "Killing others is moral." Assuming these people exist at the same time, "Killing is moral" has contradictory values attached to it; it is both true and false. Statements can't be both true and false at the same time; that's just the way logic works. Any view that leads to this conclusion is incoherent. The statement is either true or it isn't. Plus, isn't it weird that whether the statement is true or not depends on whether the given behavior happens to benefit us or not?

It only leads to a contradiction because you claim that (P ^ ¬P) is true in your example. The initiation of force is never rational and it is never moral.

5. I'm not sure how speaking of volitional consciousness changes that killing others can promote one's rational self interest, and therefore, on Rand's view, be deemed moral.

See above. Rand held (and I agree) that the initiation of force is never moral. I also don't think that it's ever rational (modulo the ethics of emergencies, which is a huge tar-pit by itself).

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Rand uses "existence exists" as an axiom, from which to base everything else. Her next steps are "something exists which one perceives" and "one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists." You can argue it's a tautology, and I don't necessarily disagree with that statement, but it's certainly an axiomatic statement.

Luckily we can bypass the issue altogether because it is peripheral to what we are discussing.

It doesn't have to be different from all other sorts of rules. Only different from some sorts of rules. We both agree that the rules of, say, chess could be what they are, or they could be something else without any consequences. However, the consequences of a moral rule that says "killing is fine" are different. Sure, a rule about when to eat isn't related to morality. But a rule that says "killing another human being is wrong because initiating the use of force is wrong, because by initiating the use of force you are making someone act against their own rational judgement" is different from a rule that says "eat at 5pm!"

If moral rules aren't different from all other sorts of rules, then they aren't a unique phenomenon and there is no such thing as a uniquely "moral" rule.

The point can be put another way: if there isn't an adequate definition that properly delineates moral rules  as a type of rule from all other sorts of rules, then there's no reason to believe that they exist as such; they won't be a unique category at all. There won't be any reason to call some rules "moral rules" and others not. "Rules derived from our essential nature" as a definition doesn't manage to keep out the apparently non-moral stuff like the species' tendency to set rules for meal times. In this respect your behavior is somewhat like the religious on the board, using the word "moral" as if it refers to something without being precise about the meaning or extension of the word. This is a behavior pretty much everybody does in everyday practice, but that doesn't mean that it isn't misguided.

A person that kills rivals for a job opening isn't acting rationally - or morally. The initiation of force is never rational or moral.

Rand held (and I agree) that the initiation of force is never moral. I also don't think that it's ever rational (modulo the ethics of emergencies, which is a huge tar-pit by itself).

It only leads to a contradiction because you claim that (P ^ ¬P) is true in your example. The initiation of force is never rational and it is never moral.

This is probably the primary point of friction between us, and I just can't see why you think deploying violence is never rational. Even if we put emergency situations on ice, there are innumerable examples in history and innumerable others we can think up in an instant that repudiate this.

Rationality is simply the proper choice of decisions, given a set of goals and a body of knowledge one possesses. There isn't anything inherent in the concept that deals with morality or immorality. Hence my example of the actions of Al Qaeda operatives being rational, given their ridiculous beliefs about martyrdom. That's why we have a concept called "bounded rationality" in the first place; it is a more realistic alternative to the optimal rationality assumption of decision theory (i.e., the assumption that people will always make the best choices in pursuit of their goals). Again, bounded rationality and the concept it is derived from simply deal with the decisions one makes in pursuit of goals -- whether the goals are admirable, realistic, moral, and so forth, or not.

As such, there is plenty of rational violence to be done (that doesn't make it right, of course). Imagine a Machiavellian scenario in Medieval Europe where a man decides to have his brother killed so that he might inherit the crown. This wasn't unheard of at the time, the man suspected his brother may have been planning a similar move against him, and the man's goals were to ascend to royalty. In this scenario his actions were perfectly rational, i.e., properly suited to his goals and in line with the body of knowledge he possessed. This is a situation where morality and rationality part ways, something that Rand's theory demands cannot happen because it identifies the two as one and the same. That's a reason to eschew Rand's theory, not redefine terms such that the theory is preserved.

Speaking of redefinition, note that the above holds true even if we define rationality as the promotion of one's own interests -- it sounds a lot like Rand defines rationality this way, hence her theory's distinctly egoistic tone, and hence my claim that the word was redefined. This is a modest variation of the original term in that it limits the class of goals to those which promote one's self interest. With this stipulation in place the term has the same implications as before, including the fact that our Machiavellian Man is acting rationally (it seems clear that by eliminating a rival and becoming a king -- a life-long goal of his -- the man was acting was in his own self-interest).

These conclusions seem obvious, and I think the only way you could be avoiding them (since intelligence isn't the problem here) is, I think, by using some colloquial version of "rationality." But I don't think it is controversial to say we ought to stick to the more precise notion used by the people who study this stuff (not that I'm one of them).

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Even if our only shared characteristic is being derived from a particular stream of genes, those particular genes are what shapes our nature. If we share them, we share our nature. That doesn't mean that we're all the same. But it does mean that for all of us, logic is our means of acquiring knowledge, for example, and rationality is the means by which we apply knowledge.

Are there those who can't do that for some reason outside of their control? Sure. But what does that prove, if anything?

I tried to tackle what I take to be the biggest problem with Rand's theory in the last post. I think that this next one is still worth discussing, however: the bolded segments here assume a singular "human nature" from whence Rand's ethics can be derived; unfortunately, there isn't any such thing.

Forgive the logical acrobatics, but I think they are necessary here. To say that a group of things X (in this case, 'Homo sapiens') has an essence (or nature) is to say a couple of things: one, all and only members of X have that essence (if there is such a thing as a human essence then only humans have it); two, the essence is responsible for the traits the members have (the human essence fixes traits like, e.g., rationality).

Whatever the merits of essentialist thinking in general, it does not work at all for biological species. The primary reason is as follows: there isn't any set of traits that all members of a given species share. To have a shared nature is to share the requisite traits associated with that nature. Thus, there cannot be any shared nature among human beings unless they all have certain traits in common. Mutation, genetic drift, and recombination constantly conspire to prevent this from occurring. There isn't anything we all have in common, and thus no shared "nature" among us. There's nothing there to derive an ethics from.

This is obvious when we look the trait Rand deems essential to being human, rationality. Mentally retarded persons lack the trait; they don't partake of Rand's definition of human nature but that just shows that that definition is inadequate, not that they aren't human beings.

At best, there are statistical propensities we can point to such that a majority of a species has a given trait (the majority of humans can be rational to some extent). But a temporary statistical propensity which the aforementioned biological forces are inevitably changing seems a flimsy thing to call a "nature" and an even flimsier thing to derive an ethics from.

Finally, if rationality were the essential component of human nature (i.e., if "being rational" was something only humans could do) then no other animals would have this capacity. Yet it is relatively clear from cognitive ethology that rationality (and cognition in general) traverses a smooth gradient from less complex and functional to more complex and functional. There isn't a difference in kind between other animals' thinking and our own. Animals clearly evince rationality and cognitive capacity to varying degrees, thus making these traits not at all unique to human beings and thus not eligible candidates for comprising a "human nature."

When a theory begins brushing up against evolutionary biology and contradicting it, I for one bid the theory adieu. Such is the case with Rand's theory. To use getbig lingo, "She won't recover."