^ ^ ^
Agree.
It’s in part about brinksmanship, and sticks and carrots, but, ultimately, it emerges from a strong desire for geopolitical recognition. I became aware of this political pas de deux back in 2006, when Dear Leader launched his lemon-grade missiles over the Sea of Japan. What did president Bush think of Mr. Kim’s show of force? He answered, "I don't know what the man's intentions are." Balderdash! He knew, but wouldn't give the Eternal Generalissimo the satisfaction.
While it’s almost impossible to peek behind the Bamboo Curtain draping the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s intentions, then and now, are far from inscrutable. Back in 2000, when Condoleezza Rice was advising then-candidate Bush on foreign policy, she made what seemed like a prescient call on North Korea: "sooner or later Pyongyang will threaten to test a missile one too many times, and the United States will [...] respond […] resolutely and decisively." Not quite. Rice’s prophecy lost its prognostic potency when the threat from Pyongyang escalated from intermittently testing mere missiles to actually detonating nuclear weapons. But for what purpose?
Certainly not to actually attack the US.* Some view North Korea’s feeble attempts at saber-rattling as angling to get more carrots at the bargaining board. The Bush administration determined that under no circumstances would any bilateral meeting occur with North Korea, much less any kind of substantive negotiations, because it did not want to convey the appearance of recognizing that a troublemaking, rogue leader like Mr. Kim had the power to initiate legitimate sit-downs with high-ranking US officials.
Subsequently, it would appear that the DPRK ramped up its nuclear program in hopes of gaining future political concessions from the US, i.e., carrots; but the angling-for-more-carrots explanation does little to illuminate the Hermit Kingdom’s intentions after so many years of geopolitical marginalization. And it seems utterly absurd given all the sanctions, i.e., sticks, it has received in return. This leaves recognition as a rational, i.e., self-interested, choice. North Korea is motivated by its desire for recognition to showcase brinksmanship via its very real nuclear capability. And this is done just as much, if not more, for domestic mythmaking reasons, than out of any hope for real international acknowledgment.
*Of course, there is the threat that non-state actors might get their hands on nuclear weapons from such shifty devils.
