Feminists Crying, Losing Hoap

[Parker]

Syntax is sharp. The other dude I dont know as about.

He's sharp, but is he Occam's Razor sharp?

[Roger Bacon]

If true, what's wrong with that?

I'm rather sure that Russell's Theory of Descriptions is a semantic theory of, predictably enough, descriptions, though it is true that he applied it to proper names as well. Independent of the truth of the Theory -- and probably descriptions don't literally have quantificational structure -- it has spurred a century of productive debate and any linguist will recognize it as a contribution to their field (just ask).

I mentioned Fodor's modularity thesis and not his Language of Thought Hypothesis, though both are major contributions to the 'mind as computer' paradigm that is so widespread in cognitive science. Again, this is the case whether the hypotheses are true or not and can be confirmed by experts in the field. Your denial of this seems to hinge on the implicit claim that neuroscience is the only 'real' science of mind, a contentious claim.

Finally, while Dennett didn't "contribute" to the study of consciousness in any direct sense, he did synthesize cognitive science research in an interesting and productive manner. You might have an overly narrow definition of 'contribution' if only the production of experimental data counts as such, something it looks like you might be implicitly claiming.

Philosophy won't necessarily continue to contribute as it has in the above examples, but that it has as a contingent matter of fact seems to me undeniable.

Linguistics ignores Russell's theory of descriptions, with the possible exception of his analysis of proper names, but that was many years ago, before it was refuted by Saul Kripke.  Please reference even one linguist who acknowledges Russell's contributions to his/her field. You are confusing linguistics with the philosophy of language.

Fodor's 1983 book that presents his early ideas on the modularity of mind was part of a reaction against behaviorism and its materialistic consequences for the philosophy of mind (as such, he worked in opposition to such philosophers of mind as Gilbert Ryle). However, Fodor, unlike cognitive scientists, rejected physicalism entirely.  His mentalistic stance has not been part of neuroscience or cognitive science for at least half a century.  The language of thought is the most recent development of his representational/mentalistic theory of mind, which is likewise a contribution to the ongoing debate within philosophy between materialists like Dennett and modern mentalists like Chalmers.  Fodor, like Dennett, is a philosopher who uses the ideas of cognitive science, but has made no contributions to the subject himself.  The mentalist/materialist war that still rages within the philosophy of mind is viewed as irrelevant by modern cognitive scientists.

As for Dennett, no I am not advancing the absurd notion that contributions to science are limited only to the production of experimental data.  That would eliminate both Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking, among others.  I am making the (obvious) point that a contribution to science implies extending an existing scientific theory in an original way, or else producing a new scientific theory, or providing scientific evidence that refutes such a theory.  Neither Russell, Fodor, nor Dennett has done any of that.

Does Goodrums supplement site, Caliber Fitness, extend science at all?

And you said getbig was full of uneducated schmucks... 

[Roger Bacon]

He's sharp, but is he Occam's Razor sharp?

[Tapeworm]

Man, I got some reading to catch up on.  About 20 years worth.    Probably shouldn't throw my hat into this particular ring.  But what the hell.

Linguistics ignores Russell's theory of descriptions, with the possible exception of his analysis of proper names, but that was many years ago, before it was refuted by Saul Kripke.  Please reference even one linguist who acknowledges Russell's contributions to his/her field. You are confusing linguistics with the philosophy of language.

Fodor's 1983 book that presents his early ideas on the modularity of mind was part of a reaction against behaviorism and its materialistic consequences for the philosophy of mind (as such, he worked in opposition to such philosophers of mind as Gilbert Ryle). However, Fodor, unlike cognitive scientists, rejected physicalism entirely.  His mentalistic stance has not been part of neuroscience or cognitive science for at least half a century.  The language of thought is the most recent development of his representational/mentalistic theory of mind, which is likewise a contribution to the ongoing debate within philosophy between materialists like Dennett and modern mentalists like Chalmers.  Fodor, like Dennett, is a philosopher who uses the ideas of cognitive science, but has made no contributions to the subject himself.  The mentalist/materialist war that still rages within the philosophy of mind is viewed as irrelevant by modern cognitive scientists.

As for Dennett, no I am not advancing the absurd notion that contributions to science are limited only to the production of experimental data.  That would eliminate both Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking, among others.  I am making the (obvious) point that a contribution to science implies extending an existing scientific theory in an original way, or else producing a new scientific theory, or providing scientific evidence that refutes such a theory.  Neither Russell, Fodor, nor Dennett has done any of that.

Well, yeah, of course.  Dr Frankenstein wasn't concerned with non-observable elements either.  

Can we find some middle ground and agree that the supra-scientific debate and the temperance it suggests is a contribution to science in itself?  Or, if I'm gonna push my luck with the lab coat types, that science is conducted under the auspice of philosophy and an effort to divorce the two or clearly distinguish them from one another is wasted?

[Gonuclear]

Man, I got some reading to catch up on.  About 20 years worth.    Probably shouldn't throw my hat into this particular ring.  But what the hell.



Well, yeah, of course.  Dr Frankenstein wasn't concerned with non-observable elements either.  

Can we find some middle ground and agree that the supra-scientific debate and the temperance it suggests is a contribution to science in itself?  Or, if I'm gonna push my luck with the lab coat types, that science is conducted under the auspice of philosophy and an effort to divorce the two or clearly distinguish them from one another is wasted?

Continental (eg, European except for those in the UK) philosophers might agree with your last statement, but Anglo-American (UK, US, and Australian) philosophers would not.   And most scientists would not.

Graduate study in philosophy only equips you to teach/conduct research in philosophy.  And philosophy these days is a very ingrown and self-absorbed field.  Unfortunately.

But the specific point made in my post is a more narrow one concerning the claimed contributions to science of the philosophers mentioned.  They have not contributed to science, although all have taken scientific findings into account in their philosophical work, which is to their credit. 

[SF1900]

And you said getbig was full of uneducated schmucks... 

.

Just the die hard republicans and conservatives.

[Roger Bacon]

.

Just the die hard republicans and conservatives.

I hope Coach kicks your ass! 

[syntaxmachine]

Please reference even one linguist who acknowledges Russell's contributions to his/her field. You are confusing linguistics with the philosophy of language.

In their popular introduction to linguistics, Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication, linguists Adrian Akmajian, Richard Demers, and Robert Harnish appropriately call Russell's Theory of Descriptions "by far the most influential theory of the semantics of definite descriptions," (p. 259) a fact anyone who has taken a few linguistics courses can confirm. Fittingly enough, the only viable alternative theory of the semantics of descriptions is also from a philosopher: Gottlob Frege (who, unlike Russell, thought that descriptions presupposed rather than asserted the existence of the entities described).

You can confirm the Theory's continuing influence by looking at how often "On Denoting" -- the paradigmatic presentation of the Theory -- is still cited by linguists to this day (yes, many of the citations linked to are philosophical journals. But many more are linguistic journals).

Fodor's 1983 book that presents his early ideas on the modularity of mind was part of a reaction against behaviorism and its materialistic consequences for the philosophy of mind (as such, he worked in opposition to such philosophers of mind as Gilbert Ryle). However, Fodor, unlike cognitive scientists, rejected physicalism entirely.  His mentalistic stance has not been part of neuroscience or cognitive science for at least half a century.  The language of thought is the most recent development of his representational/mentalistic theory of mind, which is likewise a contribution to the ongoing debate within philosophy between materialists like Dennett and modern mentalists like Chalmers.  Fodor, like Dennett, is a philosopher who uses the ideas of cognitive science, but has made no contributions to the subject himself.  The mentalist/materialist war that still rages within the philosophy of mind is viewed as irrelevant by modern cognitive scientists.

This is an interesting exposition. Fodor is generally considered the primary proponent of token physicalism, a doctrine which states (very roughly) that whilst any given concrete particular is physical, it may possess non-physical properties. Fodor applies this doctrine to the mind and suggests that whilst any particular mental state is a physical state, it will possess non-physical properties, viz., certain causal properties that relate it to other computational states of the brain. So you must have some stricter definition of 'physicalism' in mind when you assert that Fodor is a 'mentalist' rather than a physicalist. I agree with you, however, that this particular aspect of Fodor's work -- and philosophy of mind more generally -- doesn't impress cognitive scientists.

That said, I encourage any observers to browse through the 10,000+ citations of Fodor's Modularity of Mind and assess how many of them are bonafide cognitive scientific work vs. obscure philosophical work. In addition, feel free to ask any cognitive scientist about the work's influence (just email professors at your local department pretending to be an "interested student.").

As for Dennett, no I am not advancing the absurd notion that contributions to science are limited only to the production of experimental data.  That would eliminate both Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking, among others.  I am making the (obvious) point that a contribution to science implies extending an existing scientific theory in an original way, or else producing a new scientific theory, or providing scientific evidence that refutes such a theory.  Neither Russell, Fodor, nor Dennett has done any of that.

That's one way to define a contribution, sure. But to argue any further on this point is to engage in mere semantics: we will really just be asserting our preferred definitions of the word. So I will disengage on this point.

[Gonuclear]

In their popular introduction to linguistics, Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication, linguists Adrian Akmajian, Richard Demers, and Robert Harnish appropriately call Russell's Theory of Descriptions "by far the most influential theory of the semantics of definite descriptions," (p. 259) a fact anyone who has taken a few linguistics courses can confirm. Fittingly enough, the only viable alternative theory of the semantics of descriptions is also from a philosopher: Gottlob Frege (who, unlike Russell, thought that descriptions presupposed rather than asserted the existence of the entities described).

You can confirm the Theory's continuing influence by looking at how often "On Denoting" -- the paradigmatic presentation of the Theory -- is still cited by linguists to this day (yes, many of the citations linked to are philosophical journals. But many more are linguistic journals).

This is an interesting exposition. Fodor is generally considered the primary proponent of token physicalism, a doctrine which states (very roughly) that whilst any given concrete particular is physical, it may possess non-physical properties. Fodor applies this doctrine to the mind and suggests that whilst any particular mental state is a physical state, it will possess non-physical properties, viz., certain causal properties that relate it to other computational states of the brain. So you must have some stricter definition of 'physicalism' in mind when you assert that Fodor is a 'mentalist' rather than a physicalist. I agree with you, however, that this particular aspect of Fodor's work -- and philosophy of mind more generally -- doesn't impress cognitive scientists.

That said, I encourage any observers to browse through the 10,000+ citations of Fodor's Modularity of Mind and assess how many of them are bonafide cognitive scientific work vs. obscure philosophical work. In addition, feel free to ask any cognitive scientist about the work's influence (just email professors at your local department pretending to be an "interested student.").

That's one way to define a contribution, sure. But to argue any further on this point is to engage in mere semantics: we will really just be asserting our preferred definitions of the word. So I will disengage on this point.

Russell

The book you cite references Russell's work in the philosophy of language and it is as a contribution to that field that Russell's theory is characterized.  All theories of the "semantics of descriptions" are the work of philosophers, because the named topic is one in the philosophy of language, not in linguistics itself.  It is also false that the only viable alternative to Russell is Frege; there are competing theories by Saul Kripke, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and David Lewis.  The conventional wisdom is in fact that Kripke's new theory of reference, presented in his 1980 "Naming and Necessity", refutes Russell's theory, first published in "On Denoting" in 1905.  Russell's work was published in "Mind", a philosophical journal.  Further, because a linguistics text references it, does not make it a work in linguistics.  Similarly, because Thomas Kuhn, a philosopher of science, references the contributions to physics of Einstein and Newton in his "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (a work in the philosophy of science), that obviously does not mean that either Newtonian mechanics or Relativity are contributions to the philosophy of science.  

References to Russell's work

And many philosophy journals reference works in history, physics, linguistics, etc., but that just means that these works are relevant to what is being discussed; it does not make the works so referenced "contributions" to philosophy. The philosophy of language is relevant to linguistics, much as the philosophy of science is relevant to science.  But they are not the same subject, and contributions to one are not contributions to the other. NB, that none of the many published criticisms of "On Denoting" come from linguists, unless, as in the case of Robert Harnish, they hold a chair in both linguistics and philosophy (as did Noam Chomsky).  The fact that Russell's treatment of proper names was refuted by Kripke had no impact on linguistics.

Fodor

There is nothing obscure about Jerry Fodor.  He is justly famous.  As a philosopher, not a colleague of cognitive scientists, none of whom are mentalists in any sense.  They may indeed know of his work, but I believe all of them would characterize such work as contributions to the philosophy of mind, where the mentalist/materialist battle - long won by the physicalists in cognitive science - still rages. One of the many reasons why most scientists no longer take philosophy seriously.

Defining what a contribution to science is

Well, forgive me, but I presented my "definition" to clarify that I was not defining "contribution to science" in the narrow way which you suggested was the sense I meant.  You may have a different definition, but it surely cannot be just the production of empirical data.  You must agree with that, irrespective of any quibbles about my attempt at a broader and more accurate definition.  Which is the kind of definition I took you to mean when you touted the contributions to science of the philosophers you name.  None of whom made any such contributions.

[syntaxmachine]

The book you cite references Russell's work in the philosophy of language and it is as a contribution to that field that Russell's theory is characterized.

All theories of the "semantics of descriptions" are the work of philosophers, because the named topic is one in the philosophy of language, not in linguistics itself.  It is also false that the only viable alternative to Russell is Frege; there are competing theories by Saul Kripke, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and David Lewis.  The conventional wisdom is in fact that Kripke's new theory of reference, presented in his 1980 "Naming and Necessity", refutes Russell's theory, first published in "On Denoting" in 1905.  Russell's work was published in "Mind", a philosophical journal.  Further, because a linguistics text references it, does not make it a work in linguistics.  Similarly, because Thomas Kuhn, a philosopher of science, references the contributions to physics of Einstein and Newton in his "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (a work in the philosophy of science), that obviously does not mean that either Newtonian mechanics or Relativity are contributions to the philosophy of science.  

And many philosophy journals reference works in history, physics, linguistics, etc., but that just means that these works are relevant to what is being discussed; it does not make the works so referenced "contributions" to philosophy. The philosophy of language is relevant to linguistics, much as the philosophy of science is relevant to science.  But they are not the same subject, and contributions to one are not contributions to the other. NB, that none of the many published criticisms of "On Denoting" come from linguists, unless, as in the case of Robert Harnish, they hold a chair in both linguistics and philosophy (as did Noam Chomsky).  The fact that Russell's treatment of proper names was refuted by Kripke had no impact on linguistics.

1. Semantics is generally considered a branch of linguistics. Philosophers like Russell have made major contributions to semantics in the form of semantic theories for a variegated class of expressions, such as descriptions.

I've cited a popular linguistics textbook recognizing the contributions of Russell to semantics -- the book also asserts that semantics is a branch of linguistics, an uncontroversial claim -- thereby meeting your challenge to cite a single linguist (I cited a triplet) recognizing Russell as a contributor. I've pointed you toward hundreds of scholarly citations of Russell's work by linguists. I can direct you to recent linguistic work in semantics adjudicating between Fregean and Russellian theories of the semantics of descriptions, thereby affirming these theories' continued relevance to the field. (p.131) That I can do all of these things is highly suggestive of the fact that Russell in fact contributed to linguistics, whatever journal he originally published in. You haven't presented evidence to the contrary.

The same argument applies to all the other philosophers who I would assert have contributed to linguistics, e.g., Grice and Austin in pragmatics (another branch of linguistics).

2. Regarding citations: you're right, the fact that Russell's work is so widely cited by linguists doesn't by itself make it a work in linguistics. The fact that it is a work in semantics, a branch of linguistics, does. Independent of the label we apply to it, it is clearly a contribution to the scientific study of language, as evinced by (1).

3. Kripke attacked Russell's theory of descriptions as applied to names, and even then he recognized it would be true of names at least some of the time (see his discussion of 'Jack the Ripper'). He and the other philosophers you mention discuss names, whereas I am discussing Russell's semantic theory of descriptions more generally. Or did Lewis have some theory of descriptions I'm not aware of?

There is nothing obscure about Jerry Fodor.  He is justly famous.  As a philosopher, not a colleague of cognitive scientists, none of whom are mentalists in any sense.  They may indeed know of his work, but I believe all of them would characterize such work as contributions to the philosophy of mind, where the mentalist/materialist battle - long won by the physicalists in cognitive science - still rages. One of the many reasons why most scientists no longer take philosophy seriously.

Well, you're free to ask them whether, e.g., Modularity of Mind counts as a contribution to cognitive science or not.

Well, forgive me, but I presented my "definition" to clarify that I was not defining "contribution to science" in the narrow way which you suggested was the sense I meant.  You may have a different definition, but it surely cannot be just the production of empirical data.  You must agree with that, irrespective of any quibbles about my attempt at a broader and more accurate definition.  Which is the kind of definition I took you to mean when you touted the contributions to science of the philosophers you name.  None of whom made any such contributions.

We agree on this matter.

[Gonuclear]

1. Semantics is generally considered a branch of linguistics. Philosophers like Russell have made major contributions to semantics in the form of semantic theories for a variegated class of expressions, such as descriptions.

By the "semantics of descriptions", I am referring (1) to the specific issue of how descriptions (as propositional particles) refer to the external world, which is a special case of how language (as propositions) refers to reality, which is what the philosophy of language is all about; and (2) to the problem of how to model descriptions in modal contexts, which, in the case of Russell's treatment of proper names, upended his theory, thanks to Marcus and Kripke.  David Lewis also contributed to this area, with his counterpart alternative to Kripke's possible worlds semantics.  All of this stuff is philosophy of language.  And I believe your own citations support that.  Of course, semantics as the study of how natural languages acquire and sustain meaning in the context of usage by people who write and speak human languages, is a branch of linguistics.  No argument there.  Note that linguists did not participate in any of the above.  Because Russell was not working in linguistics.

I've cited a popular linguistics textbook recognizing the contributions of Russell to semantics -- the book also asserts that semantics is a branch of linguistics, an uncontroversial claim -- thereby meeting your challenge to cite a single linguist (I cited a triplet) recognizing Russell as a contributor. I've pointed you toward hundreds of scholarly citations of Russell's work by linguists. I can direct you to recent linguistic work in semantics adjudicating between Fregean and Russellian theories of the semantics of descriptions, thereby affirming these theories' continued relevance to the field. (p.131) That I can do all of these things is highly suggestive of the fact that Russell in fact contributed to linguistics, whatever journal he originally published in. You haven't presented evidence to the contrary.

You have indeed cited a source, although I believe the source discusses Russell's contributions to the philosophy of language, which in some academic departments (specifically where one of your referenced textbook's authors teaches and at MIT, where Paul Elbourne got his Phd) is taught in the same department as is linguistics. (In the case of MIT, the unification of the graduate programs in linguistics and philosophy was done for budgetary reasons; Chomsky, then chairman of the MIT department of linguistics, agreed to absorb the costs of the philosophy department at a time when it was on financial life support, and for no other reason.)

I do think that linguists reference philosophy of language quite a lot, just in the sense I mentioned.  That does not make philosophers of language contributors to linguistics.  I will grant, as I did implicitly in referring to what has transpired historically and what is true now, that in Russell's time there was a lot of overlap between the fields. But today, if one were to decide between whether to go to graduate school in linguistics or philosophy, the advice on all sides would be to pick linguistics if one's goal is to contribute to modern linguistics. But there are joint departments, and if you are saying that there is overlap, especially in the study of formal languages that Chomsky's generative grammar theories motivate for linguistics, I would have to agree.  But that is like saying that because experimental psychologists use Bayes' theorem, and reference it all the time, that Bayes contributed to psychology.  I took your citation of Russell's work to not be an argument of that sort, since you were, I believe, adducing support for your view that philosophers contribute to science.  So I took "contribute" in the more substantive sense. If all you mean is that the philosophy of language is of interest to linguistics, which regularly cites it and its practitioners in advancing linguistic theory, then I would have to grant you that.

The same argument applies to all the other philosophers who I would assert have contributed to linguistics, e.g., Grice and Austin in pragmatics (another branch of linguistics).

The same point again concerning these two, as was made regarding Russell.

2. Regarding citations: you're right, the fact that Russell's work is so widely cited by linguists doesn't by itself make it a work in linguistics. The fact that it is a work in semantics, a branch of linguistics, does. Independent of the label we apply to it, it is clearly a contribution to the scientific study of language, as evinced by (1).

You can just Google Russell in the discussed context.  The semantics of descriptions is a topic in the philosophy of language.  Although Wittgenstein did discuss the semantics of natural languages quite a bit.  Note that in the "Tractatus" he discusses semantics in the philosophical sense, and in "Philosophical Investigations" he does so with respect to its sense in linguistics.  

3. Kripke attacked Russell's theory of descriptions as applied to names, and even then he recognized it would be true of names at least some of the time (see his discussion of 'Jack the Ripper'). He and the other philosophers you mention discuss names, whereas I am discussing Russell's semantic theory of descriptions more generally. Or did Lewis have some theory of descriptions I'm not aware of?

You miss his point. That Russell's treatment of proper names is only true some of the time is the problem with it, and Kripke's possible worlds semantics for modal logic ("semantics" in the philosophical sense) shows this to be the case.  Lewis provided an alternative semantics with his counterpart theory.  

Well, you're free to ask them whether, e.g., Modularity of Mind counts as a contribution to cognitive science or not.

The problem with Fodor is his non-physicalism, as stated.  Scientists these days are materialists, at least with respect to their specific fields, whatever their beliefs generally.  

We agree on this matter.

Given that we agree on that, would you then say that philosophy also has made contributions to physics?  Not counting when physics was called "natural philosophy", as it was in Newton's day.  Would you say that Albert Einstein, because he wrote quite a bit on philosophical topics, was a contributor to modern philosophy? I would say No to all of that, as would most scientists (especially physicists), but I do think some philosophers would disagree. However, I'm with Wittgenstein, Hawking, and Weinberg in their view that philosophers generally play language games and have abdicated their historical role in understanding reality to science, to which they now make no material contributions of any kind.  

[syntaxmachine]

So I took "contribute" in the more substantive sense. If all you mean is that the philosophy of language is of interest to linguistics, which regularly cites it and its practitioners in advancing linguistic theory, then I would have to grant you that.

Perhaps ironically, all we're doing is engaging in semantics regarding the word 'contribute.' We can both agree on the above, though.

You miss his point. That Russell's treatment of proper names is only true some of the time is the problem with it, and Kripke's possible worlds semantics for modal logic ("semantics" in the philosophical sense) shows this to be the case.  Lewis provided an alternative semantics with his counterpart theory.  

Are you referring to Kripke's argument that proper names are rigid designators and that as such, descriptions cannot function as names because they refer contingently? If so, I certainly grasp that -- it is surely Kripke's fundamental point. Nonetheless, Kripke himself asserts that his analysis pertains to "many or most" (N&N, p. 80) uses of names, not all of them: stipulative definitions like 'Jack the Ripper' do use their descriptive content to fix reference. That's the sole point I was making: Kripke's argument, if successful, relegates Russell's theory to a smaller set of successful instances of reference than was commonly supposed, rather than obviating it entirely.

And I still think that it's possible to amend Russell's Theory in light of Kripke's criticisms: utilizing rigidified descriptions, or developing a 'metadescriptivist' view where there is a 'called gonuclear' or 'referred to as gonuclear' predicate in the description associated with the name. This doesn't explain how said referring occurs, but I think that that should be an issue for pragmatics anyway, not semantics. But that is a different discussion.

That said,
The problem with Fodor is his non-physicalism, as stated.  Scientists these days are materialists, at least with respect to their specific fields, whatever their beliefs generally.  

Didn't Fodor famously argue for 'token physicalism'? That position, when applied to our current understanding of mind, entails that all mental states are brain states, just that they have some non-physical properties. What's wrong with that? Don't many cognitive scientists affirm the possibility of artificial or alien intelligence? If so, they seemingly implicitly agree with Fodor since whatever property makes a given mental state the same type of mental state between such entities, it won't be physical: after all, such entities have divergent physical properties (and thus wouldn't share any mental states if mental states' properties were all physical). At least according to one popular construal of the issue.

However, I'm with Wittgenstein, Hawking, and Weinberg in their view that philosophers generally play language games and have abdicated their historical role in understanding reality to science, to which they now make no material contributions of any kind.  

I certainly agree that philosophers tend to vastly overrate their importance in determining the nature of reality, especially those who I described as autists obsessively debating retrerche thought experiments -- as if one can discover any fundamental properties of reality by sitting in one's office and contemplating whether Jones with the coins in his pocket really knew whether he got the job or not.

Still, I think that there is some value in such activity: it is explicating the nature of our folk concepts, which is what we use to understand the world outside of science. I use the term 'ethnoscience' to refer to the study of the way we understand the world (different from the study of the way the world actually is) after Chomsky did as such, and I think that the aforementioned philosophical analysis of folk concepts falls under this heading.

And, as we agreed upon above, at least in one field scientists regularly consider philosophical input when it comes to theory advancement. But there is a lot of merit in the Wittgensteinian view you espouse, yeah.

[Gonuclear]

Perhaps ironically, all we're doing is engaging in semantics regarding the word 'contribute.' We can both agree on the above, though.

We can indeed.

Are you referring to Kripke's argument that proper names are rigid designators and that as such, descriptions cannot function as names because they refer contingently? If so, I certainly grasp that -- it is surely Kripke's fundamental point. Nonetheless, Kripke himself asserts that his analysis pertains to "many or most" (N&N, p. 80) uses of names, not all of them: stipulative definitions like 'Jack the Ripper' do use their descriptive content to fix reference. That's the sole point I was making: Kripke's argument, if successful, relegates Russell's theory to a smaller set of successful instances of reference than was commonly supposed, rather than obviating it entirely.

You are right.  I misconstrued your comment.  But Kripke's recommendation for special cases like "Jack the Ripper" is not quite Russell's.  He says that in these cases the meaning is "fixed" by a description in this world, but behaves as a rigid designator in all modal contexts - hence in all possible worlds other than this one.

And I still think that it's possible to amend Russell's Theory in light of Kripke's criticisms: utilizing rigidified descriptions, or developing a 'metadescriptivist' view where there is a 'called gonuclear' or 'referred to as gonuclear' predicate in the description associated with the name. This doesn't explain how said referring occurs, but I think that that should be an issue for pragmatics anyway, not semantics. But that is a different discussion.

Yes, I agree.  In fact there have been numerous attempts to do just that, unfortunately by lesser lights than either Russell or Kripke.  However, Kripke delivered what most agree is a fatal blow to Russell's ideas, which is why I keep harping on proper names.  Russell's position on epistemology was that we directly know only sense data and our own inner mental states, and that knowledge of everything else - all external objects constituting external reality - comes from descriptions - definite and indefinite.  Kripke's work shows that this cannot be true in the case of proper names, and that, as a consequence, we know named objects directly, because the referent of their names is assigned on a case by case basis through human action (communication).  That's his "causal theory of reference", and it does away with the veil of "descriptivism", a pejorative term for Russell's (and Frege's) views of how language refers to reality.

Didn't Fodor famously argue for 'token physicalism'? That position, when applied to our current understanding of mind, entails that all mental states are brain states, just that they have some non-physical properties. What's wrong with that? Don't many cognitive scientists affirm the possibility of artificial or alien intelligence? If so, they seemingly implicitly agree with Fodor since whatever property makes a given mental state the same type of mental state between such entities, it won't be physical: after all, such entities have divergent physical properties (and thus wouldn't share any mental states if mental states' properties were all physical). At least according to one popular construal of the issue.

Fodor thinks (or thought - I am not up on his latest thinking) that type physicalism is false and token physicalism (as you describe it) is true.  That leaves him with the problem of what to replace type physicalism with (he can't use dispositions, because he rejects the behaviorism of Skinner and Ryle), so he describes mental states as computational relationships involving inner representations.  That's his version of mentalism, a non-substance mentalism, so to speak. However, it is not clear how to give an account of these inner representations, which he regards as innate.  What are they, if not brain states?  He wants to say that they are not, and his Language of Thought is an attempt to give an account of them and the relationships between them. But there are many problems with the LOT approach, not the least of which is how to relate the LOT to neuroscience.  Neuroscientists are thoroughgoing materialists and do not have much patience for invoking nonmaterial "representations" motivated by (what they view as) outdated philosophical problems.  I am not sure what the connection of all of this to AI or alien minds would be.  

I will say this about Jerry Fodor.  He is an amazing rhetorician, fully the equal of guys like the late, great Christopher Hitchens.  I once attended a seminar he gave while he was at MIT consisting of his exposition of issues he was working on at the time.  His ability to argue against virtually any position was fully on display, and it was something to behold.  He is very quick and has instant access to a seemingly endless store of examples and counter examples that support his positions and attack yours, some of which can be bizarre in the extreme.  At one point he got into a discussion of how one could conceive of "computers made of cream cheese", and somehow made it all seem plausible.  It was only later on, when you tried to rehearse what had happened, that you felt you had been expertly snookered.

Unfortunately, his reputation took a body blow when he collaborated on "What Darwin Got Wrong", which offered criticisms of natural selection that have been roundly rejected by almost everyone.  Still, if you have never heard him speak and you get a chance to attend a Fodor lecture, I think you will find it very worthwhile to see him in action.

I certainly agree that philosophers tend to vastly overrate their importance in determining the nature of reality, especially those who I described as autists obsessively debating retrerche thought experiments -- as if one can discover any fundamental properties of reality by sitting in one's office and contemplating whether Jones with the coins in his pocket really knew whether he got the job or not.

Still, I think that there is some value in such activity: it is explicating the nature of our folk concepts, which is what we use to understand the world outside of science. I use the term 'ethnoscience' to refer to the study of the way we understand the world (different from the study of the way the world actually is) after Chomsky did as such, and I think that the aforementioned philosophical analysis of folk concepts falls under this heading.

And, as we agreed upon above, at least in one field scientists regularly consider philosophical input when it comes to theory advancement. But there is a lot of merit in the Wittgensteinian view you espouse, yeah.

Namaste.  

[Roger Bacon]

You're out of your depth Gonuclear.... 

[Kwon_2]

This thread is more interesting than debating the merits of having Blue Stars!

Dennett's book, "Darwin's Dangerous Ideas" is a powerful one. It appears that the materialistic view of the universe will prevail.

Karl Popper was a giant in the philosophy of science and I see the concept 'refutation' being used here.

I did a course in the Philosophy of Neuroscience. Quite interesting that philosophers have a role to play in the science.

[Thin Lizzy]

The women I who who are very successful all exhibit unusual amounts of male characteristics, not physically, but how they act.

They walk really fast. They never have those long, silly cellphone conversations. They don't ask a lot of stupid questions.

Almost impossible to get into the pants of this type without copious amounts of wine.

[Pray_4_War]

The stupidest people engineering the most social change.

We are so fucked.

This could be the key to everything that's wrong with the United States.

A minority of opinionated dumb asses are dictating our course.

[Tapeworm]

Good stuff in here.

Fodor thinks (or thought - I am not up on his latest thinking) that type physicalism is false and token physicalism (as you describe it) is true.  That leaves him with the problem of what to replace type physicalism with (he can't use dispositions, because he rejects the behaviorism of Skinner and Ryle), so he describes mental states as computational relationships involving inner representations.  That's his version of mentalism, a non-substance mentalism, so to speak. However, it is not clear how to give an account of these inner representations, which he regards as innate.  What are they, if not brain states?  He wants to say that they are not, and his Language of Thought is an attempt to give an account of them and the relationships between them. But there are many problems with the LOT approach, not the least of which is how to relate the LOT to neuroscience.  Neuroscientists are thoroughgoing materialists and do not have much patience for invoking nonmaterial "representations" motivated by (what they view as) outdated philosophical problems.

I haven't read any of these guys but doesn't anyone make the case that brain states are observable manifestations of the wellspring of the mind?  Equating inner representations, feelings, reasoning, and the language of self-chatter to the corresponding bright bit on the brain scan seems to me to miss the point.  If I accept that a posited non-physical mass and the physical mass mirror one another in static state, and that the inner can be measured by scans, then I still have to question where changes in state come from and reject materialism's claim of mind/brain equivalence.  Leibniz 'nisi intellectus ipsi,' if I've googled that right, still doesn't seem answered, either in terms of its creative abilities without any input other than its own, or in terms of the internally combustive force which drives it to bring forth the states that neurologists get to quantify.  

[MikMaq]

The women I who who are very successful all exhibit unusual amounts of male characteristics, not physically, but how they act.

They walk really fast. They never have those long, silly cellphone conversations. They don't ask a lot of stupid questions.

Almost impossible to get into the pants of this type without copious amounts of wine.

Most likely they have a bit of autism.

Women are not wired for science.

They lack logic, obsession and drive.

And when they have that there is no desire to breed.

[Purge_WTF]

Most likely they have a bit of autism.

Women are not wired for science.

They lack logic, obsession and drive.

And when they have that there is no desire to breed.

And there's oftentimes a desire to hate men for the fact that the testosterone that God gave us makes us the more dominate and creative gender as well.

Many in the field of Psychology consider Penis Envy to be more than just a punchline.