12 Days Of Benghazi

[Coach is Back!]

John “TIG” Tiegen
@TigTiegen
12 DAYS OF BENGHAZI:

DAY 1

Before September 11, 2012, Benghazi was already giving us warning after warning.

This didn’t just come out of nowhere.

Western facilities were being targeted. Diplomats were being attacked. Extremist groups were operating throughout the area, and the security situation kept getting worse.

On April 6, an explosive was thrown over the wall of the U.S. compound.

A few days later, a UN convoy was attacked.

The Red Cross was hit with RPGs.

Then came June 6.

I was in Benghazi that night, sitting at the CIA Annex watching the cameras when the call came in that the U.S. consulate was under attack.

There were only 2 DS security personnel at the consulate that night.

As soon as the call came in, I initiated our SOP.

Wake everybody up, Gear up, Get the vehicles ready.

We had already told the 2 guys at the consulate that if something happened to them, we had their back.

We were their quick reaction force. (QRF)

We normally had ourselves ready to move in about 5 minutes. That night we were ready within roughly 5 to 10 minutes. It was around 3:30 a.m. local time in Benghazi

Then Bob stopped us.

He told us to stand down. Still wasn’t the 1st time either.

Not “wait.”

Not “hold for a minute.”

Stand down!

And yes, I remember the words.

He told us we were not going and that he would call  17Feb and have them handle it.

It’s the Team Leaders that make the decision and difference…

Meanwhile, an explosive had just blown roughly a 9-by-12-foot hole through the exterior wall of the U.S. compound. Official reports later documented the attack and said the Omar Abdul Rahman Brigade claimed responsibility, although that claim was never substantiated.

Thankfully, nobody was killed that night.

But look at what had just happened. An American compound had been attacked again.

The wall had been blown open and there were only 2 security personnel there. Read that again!

An American security team was sitting nearby, geared up and ready to move.

And we were told to stand down.

That was June 6, 2012.

97 days before September 11.

And that wasn’t the only warning.

We were also seeing AQ activity in and around Benghazi.

Reports were coming in about sightings, locations and activity.

There were people whose job was to help locate and track those networks through intelligence collection, including electronic communications and signal gathering.

And if Bob found out we were taking people out specifically to help locate or track AQ activity, he would stop us from doing it.

The threat was there.

The intelligence was there.

The attacks were already happening.

And people on the ground were trying to understand what was developing around us.

I know some of you were expecting me to do this as a podcast or video series.

I just don’t have the time this year to put that together the way I would want to.

So for the next 12 days, I’m going to tell you pieces of this story that most people have probably never heard.

Some of it is documented in government records. Some of it has been uncovered since.

And some of it I know because I was standing there when it happened.

Tomorrow, June 11.

The British Ambassador’s convoy gets hit! And once again, Bob tells us to stand down.

But that time, things go differently.

https://x.com/TigTiegen/status/2094936196057350556?s=20

[Coach is Back!]

John “TIG” Tiegen
@TigTiegen
12 DAYS OF BENGHAZI:
DAY 2

By June 11, 2012, the British had already been getting warning signs in Libya. On March 18, the British School in Benghazi was robbed at gunpoint. On April 2, a British armored diplomatic vehicle was attacked after driving into a protest. On June 8, two grenades were thrown at a parked British diplomatic vehicle in Sabha.

I had left Benghazi 5 days earlier, on June 6, the same day the U.S. consulate was attacked. When that call came in, I remember thinking, “You’ve got to be kidding me. I’m flying home today.” If it had turned into a full-on attack, I would’ve missed that flight home.

Then came June 11.

The British Ambassador’s convoy had been using the same route repeatedly, which made their movements predictable. After a meeting that day, the convoy was returning through Benghazi when it was ambushed with an RPG and small-arms fire. Two British security personnel were wounded.

Once again, Bob told the GRS team to stand down.

This time, the Team Leader made the difference. He made the decision to go anyway. The GRS team rolled out, responded to the attack, and our medic treated the wounded British security personnel.

That matters because leadership matters. Same Chief of Base. Same kind of hesitation. Different Team Leader. Different decision.

By that point, the British had already been changing how they operated in Benghazi because of the security situation. After the June 11 ambush, they suspended their Benghazi mission altogether. When they later returned for day missions, their vehicles and weapons were stored at the U.S. consulate.

Think about that. The British had already been targeted multiple times. Their Ambassador was then ambushed. They changed the way they operated and reduced their exposure even further.

The United States stayed.

Did they change their security posture or start listening to the guys on the ground?

Nope.

And we were still 92 days away from September 11.

[Coach is Back!]

12 DAYS OF BENGHAZI: DAY 3

DERNA

Earlier in my time in Libya, I made 2 trips into Derna. We drove through the city, got out, and even walked the markets. At that point, we could still operate there.

That changed.

As the security situation deteriorated, Derna became a place we stopped going ourselves. The terrorist presence had grown to the point that the risk was no longer worth it. That wasn’t just our assessment either. Government testimony later described Derna as an area Americans generally avoided because it was known for harboring al-Qaeda sympathizers.

At the same time, we were getting reports about AQ activity, sightings and locations throughout eastern Libya. There were intelligence personnel whose job was to help locate and track those networks, including through electronic communications and signal collection.

What most people don’t know is that I watched some of those reports get ignored. If Bob found out we were taking personnel out specifically to help locate or track AQ activity, he would shut it down.

I’m not going into names, equipment, specific locations or methods. There is no reason to. The important part is that we were not operating blind. The terrorist presence was there, people on the ground were seeing it, and there were opportunities to learn more about what those networks were doing.

Here is something else most people probably don’t know.

On September 11, 2012, when the attack in Benghazi began, an unarmed Predator was already flying over Derna conducting an intelligence collection mission. Once Benghazi came under attack, that Predator was redirected to us.

Think about that. By September 11, Derna had become dangerous enough that we had stopped going there ourselves, yet the United States was still collecting intelligence over the city. Members of Ansar al-Sharia in Derna were later identified by the State Department as having been involved in the Benghazi attacks.

The threat didn’t suddenly appear on September 11. We had been watching it grow. The question was never whether the warning signs existed.

[Coach is Back!]

12 DAYS OF BENGHAZI: DAY 4

I was operating out of the Annex. We were not the State Department, we were not at the U.S. Consulate, and we did not operate under the same security structure.

By August 2012, the State Department mission in Benghazi had security “tripwires.” The tripwires I’m talking about applied to the State Department mission in Benghazi.

State’s own security people were also asking for more U.S. protection. In July, the Libya mission requested additional temporary-duty U.S. security personnel, and Eric Nordstrom was pushing to keep additional security teams in Libya. Instead of the U.S. security presence growing as the threat got worse, it was shrinking.

By August, those conditions were piling up. A State Department cable from August 16 said officials were reviewing the tripwires because of increasing violent incidents, organizations leaving Benghazi, the rise of potentially anti-Western militias, and weak Libyan security support.

The local armed security presence at the U.S. mission was no longer being provided. Requests for a daily police presence had gone unanswered. State officials were also raising concerns about their relationship with the 17 Feb.

That is what people need to understand when they hear the word “tripwire.” It wasn’t just some general warning. These were specific conditions that were supposed to trigger changes in how the State Department operated.

And by then, the State Department mission was already down to mission-critical personnel. There wasn’t much left to reduce.

So they were discussing another option: suspended operations.

That meant restricting outside movement and conducting business from inside the compound.

Think about where things had gotten by August.

Violence was increasing, militias were becoming more aggressive, local security support was breaking down, and other organizations were leaving Benghazi.

And State was already discussing what to do if normal operations could no longer continue. By August, the warning signs were no longer hard to see. They were right in their faces, but Washington didn’t want to see it or hear it.

We were less than a month away from September 11.

[Royalty]

Coach, this is infuriating.