I will be shocked if a handful of judges in California do not find some way to invalidate the people's vote, again. They can't rely on the U.S. Constitution (no court has), but they can probably manufacture some argument based on whatever their state constitution says to get around what millions of California have now decided twice.
I suspect that the reasons they didn't stay the enforcement of their ruling a few months ago were (1) they wanted it to influence the outcome of the vote and (2) even if the vote was "Yes" on prop 8, they could then say the vote is contrary some newly created constitutional right that requires a two-thirds majority vote.
We'll probably see some contorted ruling in a few months.
This is Cut and Paste from an article in Salon and the whole article is worth reading:
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/05/22/wittes/That a law invalidated by a court is supported by a large majority
is not an argument supporting the conclusion that the court's decision was wrong. Central to our system of government is the premise that there are laws which even the largest majorities are prohibited from enacting because such laws violate the constitutional rights of minorities. Thus, the percentage of people who support the law in question, and how lengthy and painstaking the process was that led to the law's enactment, is totally irrelevant in assessing the propriety of a court decision striking down that law on constitutional grounds.
Contrary to Wittes' extremely confused argument, a court striking down a law supported by large majorities is not antithetical to our system of government. Such a judicial act is
central to our system of government. That's because, strictly speaking, the U.S. is not a "democracy" as much as it a "constitutional republic," precisely because constitutional guarantees trump democratic majorities. This is all just seventh-grade civics, something that the Brookings scholar and those condemning the California court's decision on similar grounds seem to have forgotten.
The duty -- the central obligation -- of judges faithfully applying the law and fulfilling their core duties is to strike down laws that violate the Constitution,
without regard to what percentage of the population supports that law, and without regard to whether it would be "better" in some political sense if democratic majorities some day got around to changing their minds about it. It's perfectly appropriate for, say, marriage equality advocates or political candidates to take into account whether it would be preferable, in some political or strategic sense, to achieve gay marriage incrementally or legislatively, only once there is majority support for it. But that is a completely inappropriate factor for a judge to consider, because the judge's
sole consideration is whether the law is consistent with Constitutional protections.
Alexander Hamilton, in defining the core function of federal judges in Federalist 78, explained this as clearly as it could be explained (though apparently not clearly enough for Wittes):
wherever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.
When -- to use Hamilton's formulation -- judges "disregard" a "particular statute" in favor of constitutional guarantees, they aren't undermining our system of government. They're upholding it. The principal purpose of the Constitution is to prohibit the enactment of rights-abridging laws which, by definition (given that they are being democratically enacted), are
supported by majorities. Anyone who argues that a court is acting improperly solely by virtue of the fact that it is striking down a popular law is someone who doesn't believe in the American system of government created by the Founders.