The recent visit of US President Obama to Turkey was far more significant than the President's speech would suggest. For Washington Turkey today has become a geopolitical "pivot state" which is in the position to tilt the Eurasian power equation towards Washington or significantly away from it depending on how Turkey develops its ties with
Moscow and its role regarding key energy pipelines.
If Ankara decides to collaborate more closely with Russia, Georgia's position is precarious & Azerbaijan's natural gas pipeline route to Europe, the so-called Nabucco Pipeline, is blocked. If it cooperates with the United States & manages to reach a stable treaty with 'Armenia' under US auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against Europe.
For Washington the key to bringing Germany into closer cooperation with the US is to weaken German dependence on Russian energy flows. Twice in the past three wintersWashington has covertly incited its hand-picked President in Ukraine - 'Viktor Yushchenko' to arrange an arbitrary cut off of Russian gas flows to Germany & other EU destinations. The only purpose of the actions was to convince 'EU' governments that Russia was not a reliable energy partner. Now, with the Obama visit to Ankara, Washington is attempting to win Turkish support for its troubled - Nabucco - alternative gas pipeline through Turkey from Azerbaijan which would theoretically at least lessen EU dependence on Russian gas.
None of this detracts from the fact that back in 01 the agenda was to get that pipe-line through Afghanistan, & you know that.
So why the semantics ??
But you knew this already didn't you ??
Just like the photo's/film of 'Taliban' officials being given the red carpet treatment in the US, just before the 9/11 attacks.
Your comments about Iraq (WTF has Iraq got to do with this ?? yeah, good one 
)have sealed your fate here, my well informed (by CNN & GOV documentation) friend.
Your ball....................
The agenda, has always been to get Caspian oil and natural gas to the black sea and to Europe.
TAPI was never a serious contender because of the enormous costs associated with it and the problems with instability in the area.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgase.htmlJuly 2002
Caspian Sea Region: Natural Gas Export Options
In addition to problems related to the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea and several regional conflicts, natural gas exports from the Caspian region have been hindered by geography. The majority of the Caspian Sea region's natural gas reserves are located on the east side of the Caspian, in relatively remote Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, as well as in Uzbekistan. This distance from markets, as well as the lack of infrastructure to deliver this natural gas to customers, has tempered interest in the Caspian region's natural gas potential.
However, the 1999 natural gas discovery of Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field appears to have boosted the region's natural gas export prospects. The Shah Deniz field, thought to be the largest natural gas discovery worldwide since 1978, already is being developed for export to Turkey, and the infrastructure that will be built to deliver this natural gas has helped to renew international interest in the region's natural gas.
In addition, Kazakhstan is beginning to tap its huge natural gas production potential, with plans to become a net natural gas exporter in the near future, and Turkmenistan is seeking to boost its natural gas output. Although the infrastructure to deliver this natural gas to customers will be costly, multiple routes for Caspian region natural gas exports have been proposed.
Northwest, via Russia
Prior to 1997, the only option for exporting Caspian region natural gas was via the Russian natural gas pipeline system. Although over 2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of Caspian Sea region natural gas was piped via the Central Asia Center gas pipeline in 1990, exports fell to 0.3 Tcf in 1997 when Russia's Gazprom, which is a competitor with Turkmen natural gas and owns the Russian pipelines through which Turkmenistan exports, denied Turkmenistan access to the system over a payment dispute.
Following resolution of this dispute, Turkmenistan exported 1.1 Tcf of natural gas via Russia in 2000, with 918 billion cubic feet (Bcf) sent to Russia and 177 Bcf contracted to Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Gazprom have agreed to increase shipments of Turkmen natural gas via Russia to between 1.8 Tcf and 2.1 Tcf per year by 2005 to 2006, with total capacity on this line as much as 3.5 Tcf per year. On May 14, 2001, Turkmenistan and Ukraine agreed to a major natural gas export deal through 2006 under which Turkmenistan will provide Ukraine with a total of 8.83 Tcf of natural gas via Russia between 2002 and 2006.
The existing Russian natural gas pipeline system also could be expanded to allow Central Asian natural gas exports to enter the Russian pipeline system en route to European customers. Existing pipelines through Kazakhstan and Russia have the capacity to transport over 700 Bcf per year, and capacity could be increased by an additional 50% by adding more compressors. The Russian natural gas pipelines through Astrakhan and Dagestan provide other options for Caspian region exports. Another proposal has been to transport natural gas from Kazakhstan to a proposed new LNG terminal on the Taman peninsula in Russia, where it would be transported to world markets via tankers.
Caspian region natural gas exports could also reach the growing Turkish natural gas market via Russia. This could occur by using an existing Russian natural gas pipeline to Georgia and connecting to a proposed new pipeline from Georgia to Turkey, possibly passing through Armenia en route. However, construction of this pipeline has been shelved as Russia concentrates instead on its own Blue Stream pipeline to deliver gas to Turkey.
The Blue Stream pipeline, scheduled to be completed in the spring of 2002, will pass under the Black Sea from the Russian port of Tuapse to the Turkish coastal city of Samsun. Rather than building a competing pipeline to transit Caspian natural gas via its territory to Turkey, Russia is likely to buy Caspian region natural gas and then re-export that natural gas to Turkey via the Blue Stream pipeline.
West, via Georgia to Turkey (and on to Europe)
Demand for natural gas in Turkey, the region's largest energy consumer, is projected to increase over the next 10 years. As such, Caspian region natural gas exporters are competing to supply the Turkish market, and Georgia could become a major transit center for natural gas. In addition, in March 2002 Turkey and Greece signed a memorandum of understanding to build a $300 million natural gas pipeline linking the two countries, allowing Caspian Sea region natural gas to reach European Union consumers.
After months of negotiation and delay, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a long-term natural gas purchase and supply contract on March 12, 2001. Starting in 2004, Azerbaijan will deliver 70 Bcf of natural gas to Turkey, rising to 233 Bcf in 2007 and continuing until 2018. Natural gas for the deal will come mainly from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field, which is scheduled to come online in 2004. In order to deliver this natural gas, it will be necessary to construct a pipeline from Baku to Erzurum in eastern Turkey, where the natural gas will join the Turkish natural gas distribution system. Originally, Azeri officials had hoped to use the existing Soviet-era Gazi-Magomed-Gazakh pipeline, but technical inspection of the pipeline, along with the planned export volumes, determined that a new pipeline will be necessary.
The Baku-Erzurum pipeline will stretch some 630 miles, including 290 miles in Azerbaijan and approximately 170 miles in both Georgia and Turkey. Currently, the pipeline project is estimated to cost $1 billion. Credits to be drawn from international financial institutions, including the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and investors from the United States and Japan are expected to cover 70% of the pipeline's construction costs, while shareholders in the development of the Shah Deniz field development will contribute the remaining 30%.
In September 2001, Georgia and Azerbaijan cleared a major hurdle for implementation of the pipeline plan by signing a transit agreement. The Azeri parliament ratified the transit agreement in October 2001, followed by the Georgian parliament in December 2001. In January 2002, Georgia announced it would build two, 88.3-Bcf-capacity underground natural gas storage facilities in the east and southwest of the country as part of the pipeline project.
Construction of the Baku-Erzurum pipeline is scheduled to begin in late 2002, with the pipeline operational by the end of 2004. Initial capacity on the pipeline is slated to be 777 billion cubic feet (Bcf) per year, with capacity eventually rising to 1.06 Tcf per year. With natural gas production in the first stage of exploitation of the Shah Deniz field expected to be 282 Bcf per year, the Baku-Erzurum pipeline will have excess capacity to pipe additional Caspian Sea region natural gas exports, possibly from Turkmenistan if the Caspian littoral states agree on a legal regime for the Sea, allowing the proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline to be built.
Natural gas also could transit Georgia via a proposed north-south pipeline from Russia to eastern Turkey, with one route also passing through Armenia. In November 2000, Georgia approved a project for a 37-mile pipeline to carry Russian natural gas to Turkey via the Georgian Black Sea coast. After a September 2001 meeting, Georgian officials announced that representatives from Conoco and Turkey's Acsoy Group were ready to invest in the pipeline, which would transport 35.3 Bcf per year of natural gas from Kobuleti, Georgia, to Hopa, Turkey.
Georgia also has held discussions with Gazprom on refurbishing the existing North Caucasus-Transcaucasian natural gas pipeline and extending it into a trans-Georgian pipeline to bring Russian natural gas to Armenia and Turkey. However, this idea has lost some support as Russia focuses on delivering its gas to Turkey via the "Blue Stream" natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea.
Caspian Sea Region Existing and Proposed Natural Gas Pipelines map. Having problems, call our National Energy Information Center on 202-586-8800 for help.South, via Iran to Turkey
In December 1997, Turkmenistan launched the $190-million Korpezhe-Kurt Kui pipeline to Iran, the first natural gas export pipeline in Central Asia to bypass Russia. The 124-mile pipeline, which had an initial capacity of 141 Bcf, will have a peak capacity of 282 Bcf per year. In 2000, Turkmenistan exported 106 Bcf to Iran via the pipeline, with that figure increasing to 154 Bcf in 2001.
According to terms of the 25-year contract between the two countries, Turkmenistan will pipe between 177 Bcf and 212 Bcf of natural gas to Iran annually, with 35% of Turkmen supplies allocated as payment for Iran's contribution to building the pipeline. In December 2001, the presidents of Turkmenistan and Armenia reached an agreement by which Turkmenistan will supply up to 70.6 Bcf per year to Armenia via the Korpezhe-Kurt Kui pipeline and across Iran. Implementation of this deal is contingent on the construction of a long-delayed Iran-Armenia natural gas pipeline.Construction of the $120 million, 84-mile Iran-Armenia pipeline link has been delayed for years due to disagreements between the two sides over natural gas prices and the location of the pipeline.
In addition, any large investment in Iran's oil and natural gas sector would be legally problematic. U.S. Presidential Executive Orders signed in 1995 prohibit U.S. companies from conducting business with Iran. Furthermore, the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which was renewed for five years in August 2001, imposes sanctions on non-U.S. companies that make large investments in the Iranian oil and natural gas sectors.
Southeast, to Pakistan via Afghanistan or Iran
In July 1997, Turkmenistan signed a memorandum of understanding with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan to build a Central Asia Gas pipeline to carry 0.7 Tcf of natural gas per year via Afghanistan to Pakistan (and possibly on to India). In October 1997, Unocal set up the Central Asian Gas Pipeline (Centgas) consortium to build the pipeline, which would run 900 miles from the Turkmen natural gas deposit at Dauletabad through Kandahar, Afghanistan, and terminate in the Pakistani city of Multan. The pipeline was estimated to cost $2 billion.
However, in June 1998, Russian natural gas giant Gazprom bowed out of the international consortium formed to build the pipeline, and in early August 1998, Unocal announced that Centgas had not secured the financing necessary to begin the work. On August 22, 1998, Unocal suspended construction plans for the pipeline due to the continuing civil war in Afghanistan and the U.S. missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps. In April 1999, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan agreed to reactivate the Centgas project, and to ask the Centgas consortium, now led by Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil, to proceed, but continuing fighting in Afghanistan, as well as sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the United Nations on Afghanistan, kept the project on hold.
Until recently, the pipeline was considered effectively dead, but with a fragile peace in Afghanistan established and the Taliban removed from power, the idea of a trans-Afghan pipeline has been revived. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov and Afghan leader Hamid Karzai have expressed their support for the pipeline, and Uzbek President Islam Karimov is also on record advocating the pipeline. In May 2002, Karzai, Niyazov, and Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf held trilateral talks on the pipeline proposal.
Since the Taliban government in Afghanistan was ousted in December 2001 as part of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, this pipeline option has gained some support, but continuing instability in the region may deter potential investors. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones, during a visit to Ashgabat in January 2002, stated that the United States would support private companies that chose to undertake trans-Afghanistan pipeline projects if they were considered to be beneficial and commercially viable.
However, continuing tensions between India and Pakistan make cooperation on a natural gas pipeline highly unlikely for the time being. Although the trans-Afghanistan pipeline could still be built to terminate in Pakistan rather than India, the southeast pipeline option for Caspian natural gas exports remains a distant possibility
Trans-Caspian Western Routes
In order to give Central Asian countries an alternative to exporting their natural gas via the Russian pipeline system, the United States has supported the idea of trans-Caspian pipelines rather than routing pipelines through Iran. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency funded a $750,000 feasibility study by Enron for a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, and another feasibility study was also completed by Unocal.
On May 21, 1999, Turkey and Turkmenistan signed a 30-year agreement to ship 565 Bcf/year of Turkmen gas to Turkey, with the rest exported to Europe, starting in 2002. In addition, on November 18, 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan signed an Intergovernmental Declaration laying the legal framework for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) route running from Turkmenistan, through Azerbaijan and Georgia, to Turkey.
However, the 1,020-mile TCGP, which is estimated to cost between $2 billion and $3 billion to construct, has been mired in problems, and the future of the project is uncertain. Negotiations between Turkmenistan and the international consortium backing the project have stalled over payment and price issues, and PSG, the co-operator of the project with Royal Dutch/Shell, closed its office in Turkmenistan in October 2000. Also, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have been unable to agree on space allocations for the pipeline, which has a planned capacity of between 565 Bcf and 1.1 Tcf of natural gas.
Turkmenistan had offered Azerbaijan 30% of the pipeline volumes for Azeri natural gas exports, but with the discovery of the Shah Deniz natural gas field in 1999 in Azeri waters, Azerbaijan hardened in its resolve to receive 50% of the available capacity on the pipeline. After negotiations stalled, in March 2001, Azerbaijan consummated a natural gas export deal of its own with Turkey, lowering Turkmenistan's leverage in negotiations over pipeline volumes. In order to supply Turkey with this natural gas, Azerbaijan is proceeding with plans to construct the aforementioned Baku-Erzurum pipeline.
Although Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan resumed talks on the TCGP in October 2001, the lack of a legal framework governing the use of the Caspian Sea continues to complicate the issue of constructing the pipeline. In addition, several of the Caspian littoral states are opposed to trans-Caspian pipelines on environmental grounds. The U.S. continues to support the project in principle, although Stephen Mann, the U.S. Ambassador for Caspian Basin Energy Development, said that Turkmenistan will have to seek the support of private investor companies in order for the project to move forward. Royal Dutch/Shell continues to support the TCGP project.
East, to China
Exxon, Mitsubishi, and China National Petroleum submitted a preliminary feasibility study for the construction of the world's longest natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Chinese coast, perhaps continuing onwards to Japan. The 1-Tcf capacity pipeline would start in Turkmenistan and traverse Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before traveling the length of China--a 4,161-mile journey to Xinjiang. The pipeline's estimated cost is $10 billion, which, along with logistical difficulties related to building the longest pipeline, has diminished investor interest in the project.
