Didn't you promise Ron you wouldn't do this?
He's crippled by a lack of autocracy; he simply lacks self-control. Why?
Decorum requires that I simultaneously employ the principles of charity and sufficient reason to Matt's words for an attempt to explain their uncontrollable references to race and to himself. I believe that my labors in the vineyard of scholarship has been rewarded by locating the following studies, which can help to shed light on Matt's festering foibles.
In "What Is It Like to Be a Matt?" (1974), Thomas Nagel argues that an organism has conscious states
iff it has a subjective character of experience, i.e., consciousness = 'what it is like to be' x (in this case, x = a Matt). Nagel goes on to state that while a Matt certainly possesses distinct phenomenal markers,
e.g.,
inter alia,
1. begetting
bastardi, with more to come (~>3),
2. plagiarizing materials for imaginary arguments with Richard Dawkins on such disreputable
fora as Facebook,
3. returning to college for a second degree (in Mathematics) which, being no Good Will Hunting, has no value other than being framed on a wall of vanity, and
4. being fired as a lowly grader by his own math department for impolitic posts on social media,
our access to its unique subjective character is epistemically opaque. However, although Nagel concludes that we cannot have first-person knowledge of what it is like to be a Matt, we can still attempt to study the problem of Matt in order to understand its recurring message and why it can’t stop talking about itself.
It was to this problem that Hilary Putnam undertook in his influential "Brains in a Matt" (1979). Putnam sets his piece in a laboratory at a college with an 83% acceptance rate, Thunder Bay's Flakehead University. There, we encounter an idiot savant
sans l’savant, namely, an enMatted brain being fed simulated programming that carry with them the "qualitative feels" or subjective character of experience that make it seem as if everything is normal to an autistic stooge. The only sort of things an enMatted brain knows is what is being fed to it by the scientist’s input. So, if speaking or typing in English, an enMatted brain speaks and types a sort of "Matt-English." Matt-English appears exactly like English, except, because the input it receives has no truck with outer reality, all "Matt-words" cannot refer to the world outside of its enMattedness, but only to "Matt-things." Thus, Putnam argues, an enMatted brain can only spew out its fed programming and can only refer to itself.
Putnam’s solution to the problem of Matt suggests that while Nagel was right about the unfamiliar states of consciousness which block our access to know what it is like to be a Matt, an enMatted brain presents enough familiar points of contact between its epistemolinguistic structures for us to understand its strict confinement to repetition and self-reference. And it was precisely this strange Matt-blend of the familiar and unfamiliar that Sigmund Freud anticipated in his famous study of
The Uncanning (1919).
In other words, the poor chap can't help it. He's a broken record.